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RESUMO 
 
             Quando a China lançou um anti-satélite (ASAT) em Janeiro de 2007 para destruir 
um de seus satélites meteorológicos inactivos, a maioria das reacções de académicos e 
especialistas espaciais dos Estados Unidos da América focaram-se numa potencial 
“corrida espacial” militar entre os Estados Unidos e China. 
 Esquecido, no entanto, é o crescente papel da China como competidor global no 
lado não-militar do espaço. O programa espacial Chinês vai muito além das aplicações 
militares contra-espaciais e as manifestas aspirações a missões tripuladas, incluindo a 
exploração lunar. A sua busca de ambos os empreendimentos comerciais e científicos 
internacionais constitui uma pequena, mas crescente, percentagem global de lançamentos 
para o espaço e para a indústria dos serviços relacionados com satélite. Destaca-se 
também a vontade da China para cooperar com as nações distantes da Ásia para fins 
políticos e estratégicos. Estas parcerias podem constituir um desafio para os Estados 
Unidos e aumentar o “soft power” da China entre os principais aliados dos Estados 
Unidos e mesmo em algumas regiões tradicionalmente de influência estado-unidense (por 
exemplo, a América Latina e África). Assim sendo, uma resposta adequada dos E.U.A. 
não pode estar assente no empreendimento de um esforço contra-espacial baseado no 
“hard power”, mas sim num renascimento dos esforços estado-unidenses de exploração 
espacial do passado, bem como a implementação de políticas de controle de exportações 
mais favoráveis para os negócios. 
 
 
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: China, República Popular da China, o espaço, os satélites, soft 
power, contra-espaciais, APSCO, APRSAF, E.U.A., política espacial, a segurança do 
espaço, ASAT, ITAR 
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                                              ABSTRACT 
 
      When China launched an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in January 2007 to destroy 
one of its inactive weather satellites, most reactions from academics and U.S. space 
experts focused on a potential military “space race” between the United States and China. 
Overlooked, however, is China’s growing role as global competitor on the non-military 
side of space. China’s space program goes far beyond military counterspace applications 
and manifests manned space aspirations, including lunar exploration. Its pursuit of both 
commercial and scientific international space ventures constitutes a small, yet growing, 
percentage of the global space launch and related satellite service industry. It also 
highlights China’s willingness to cooperate with nations far away from Asia for political 
and strategic purposes. These partnerships may constitute a challenge to the United States 
and enhance China’s “soft power” among key American allies and even in some regions 
traditionally dominated by U.S. influence (e.g., Latin America and Africa). Thus, an 
appropriate U.S. response may not lie in a “hard power” counterspace effort but instead 
in a revival of U.S. space outreach of the past, as well as implementation of more 
business-friendly export control policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: China, People’s Republic of China, space, satellites, soft power, 
counterspace, APSCO, APRSAF, U.S. space policy, space security, ASAT, ITAR. 
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                                                          INTRODUCTION 
 
         The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the political dimension of 
contemporary space activities by analyzing the strategic objectives and motivations of the 
governments that undertake this programme particularly how China is using space as a 
“soft power” tool in International Relations and whether Washington is miscalculating 
the main direction of China’s threat to U.S. space policy and strategy.   
        Today’s world politics is in fase of transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, and 
it’s characterized by competition among nations. As Robert Kagan notes, the grand 
expectation that after the Cold War the world would enter an era of a peaceful and 
homogeneous international system has proven wrong. Competition for status and global 
influence has once again become the key feature of the international scene.1     
        As a reflection of the international system, the contemporary space environment is 
characterized by a multiplicity of space-faring nations2 competing for honour and 
influence. Where the traditional space pattern was limited to the political-military 
confrontation of the United States and the former Soviet Union, recent decades have seen 
the rapid proliferation of new nations active in space, including developing and smaller 
countries.  
        China, India, Japan and the European Union all now have independent capabilities 
to send satellites and spacecraft into orbit, including the indigenous production of launch 
vehicles. Several other countries, such as Israel, South Korea, Brazil, Iran, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Turkey and Taiwan, are at various stages of development of their own satellite 
and launching capabilities.  
       The origin of the “Space Age”, and thus of the politics of space, can be traced back 
to the 4
th 
October 1957, when the Soviet Union launched, from a secret missile base in 
the  Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan, the first man-made orbiting satellite, Sputnik I.  
       This event is regarded as a fundamental transition point in world history and changed 
the context of international relations, generating the global perception that the United 
                                                 
1
 Kagan, R 2008, The Return of History and the End of Dreams. 
2
 The term space-faring nation is used to define a nation capable to launch vehicles into space 
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States was technically inferior to, and hence potentially weaker, than the Soviet Union, 
and conferring to the latter significant prestige, translated as an increased power status3.     
       The United States’ political status and national interests were therefore at stake when 
President John F. Kennedy announced in 1961 the creation of the Apollo program, 
intended to send a man to the moon and back before the end of the decade. 
       The Apollo program was therefore created to counter the negative perception 
generated by the Sputnik’s success; the logic behind Apollo was a space race for 
leadership strategy in the Cold War fight for global influence against the Soviets.  
       As Joan Johnson-Freese notes, space is a strategic asset capable of directly securing 
national and foreign policy interests, and it “has never been solely, or even primarily, 
about exploration. It has always been linked to other goals, usually related to foreign 
policy.”4 
      The studies of Michael Sheehan also provide a corrective to the idea that space 
programmes are science-driven, according to Sheehan, “space and politics are, and 
always have been, inseparably interlinked. The central driving force for all space 
programmes has been political objectives. Space programmes have reflected and 
implemented the prevailing national and international ideologies of the time, whether 
they are power politics, communist internationalism, European integration, national self-
determination or anything else”.5
 
 
 
    1. RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVE 
        Ever since China launched an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in early 2007 to destroy 
one of its inactive weather satellites, a great deal of attention has focused on prospects for 
a possible military “space race” between the United States and China. 
                                                 
3The U.S. Information Agency in the report “Impact of U.S. and Soviet Space Programs on World 
Opinion”, published in July 1959, determined: “In sum: Sensitivity to military implications is marked, and 
has produced strong concern over the possibility that the USSR now enjoys military superiority over the 
West, and a belief in some quarters that this is a fact…Soviet successes in space have produced a major 
revision in the image of the USSR and to some degree of the Soviet system, and lent greatly enhanced 
credibility to Soviet propaganda claims. The USSR, by appearing to have spectacularly overtaken the US in 
a field in which the US was very generally assumed to be first by a wide margin, is now able to present 
itself as fully comparable to the US and able to challenge it in any field it chooses -- perhaps the most 
striking aspect of the propaganda impact of space developments”.  
4Johnson-Freese, J 2007, Space as a Strategic Asset, Columbia University Press, p.7.  
5
 Sheehan, M 2007, The International Politics of Space, Routledge, p.2   
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However, has been overlooked is China’s growing role as global competitor on the non-
military side of space. Thus, the focus of this thesis addresses the question of how is 
China using cooperative commercial and scientific space ventures as part of a larger 
strategy to increase its soft power and enhance its international reputation and influence 
with in Asia and across the globe. 
       The objective of this research consists in providing a better understanding of the 
contemporary politics of space. The present acceleration and expansion of international 
space capabilities and activities will be therefore described in terms of “soft power,” that 
is the quest for international prestige and national pride.   
 
    2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
        The literature on China’s space activities is already voluminous. A subset of this 
work address issues of direct relevance to this thesis: Is China pursuing a space program 
to enhance national unity? Or is it focused more on its economic development? It is done 
for international respect? Or are the efforts at military power projection through space 
assets part of a larger anti-access strategy so it can retake Taiwan without interference 
from Washington? 
       A study by U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. J. Barry Patterson looked at China’s space 
program from the perspective of the threat posed to the United States in two main areas: 
economic impact and security. He argues that since the Chinese space program is 
subsidized by the government (exaggerated further by the generally lower comparative 
wages for its space scientists as well the undervalued renminbi), Beijing is in a position to 
“dump” space launch services onto the world market.6 He also cites security concerns 
that any assistance given to the Chinese in increasing launch reliability and apogee kick 
motor technologies would be directly transferable to their Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missile (ICBM) program and, worse yet, possibly exported to “rogue nations” and used 
against American interests.7 Given that the paper was written in 1995, some of the data 
are not as relevant today, especially given the growing number of Chinese commercial 
                                                 
6
 Lieutenant Colonel J. Barry Patterson, China’s Space Program and its Implications for the United States 
(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, April 19, 1995), 16. 
7
 Ibid. 20-22. Apogee kick motors are used to boost satellites from geostationary transfer orbit (GTO, 
approx. 600 miles) out to geostationary (GEO, approx. 22,300 miles) but would also help Chinese military 
refine their solid-rocket motors. 
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and non-strategic (space science) launches since the Loral-Hughes scandal. However, the 
potential for dual-use, civilian-military space technology transfer has been consistently 
raised as one of main objections to Chinese-U.S. space cooperation and the issue will 
likely remain a thorny issue for some time to come. 
       Steven Lambakis sees China’s growing commercial space capabilities as having an 
important role to play militarily as well. He highlights Chinese recognition of space as a 
“new arena for competition” and a “strategic frontier” that needs to be defended.8 
Citing a number of Chinese Army generals, defense professionals, and numerous FBIS 
translations from Chinese military journals dating mostly from the mid-1990s, he draws 
the conclusion that that China fully understands and appreciates the wide array of 
military advantages that space offers, especially in a Taiwan Strait scenario. He asserts 
that “military satellites are now legitimate targets in war…and thus ASATs are legitimate 
weapons”.9 
      Three events in recent history have shaped a decidedly negative view of the 
Chinese space program: the Cox Commission Report, the Wen Ho Lee scandal, and the 
2007 Chinese Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test. The Cox Commission Report, released in 1999, 
painted China as a direct threat to the United States, especially with regard to space-based 
as well as ground-based anti-satellite systems.10 Its genesis was the botched Chinese 
Long March 2E rocket launches of Hughes satellites in 1992 and 1995 and the failed 
Long March 3B launch of Loral’s Intelsat 708 and the subsequent efforts by these U.S. 
companies to help the Chinese analyze and overcome their technical problems. Although 
several chapters of the Cox report are concerned with possible transfers of high 
performance computers and U.S. nuclear weapons designs, the bulk of the report 
investigates Chinese acquisition of American technology for their missile and space 
forces and satellite launches. It details Chinese efforts to use U.S. technology to enhance 
their Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and military space program through 
advances in missile airframe fairing (shroud) design and reliability, improved guidance 
                                                 
8
 Steven J. Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power (Lexington, KY: 
University of Kentucky Press, 2001), 192-193. 
9Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power, 194. Also see William E. Burrows, 
The Survival Imperative: Using Space to Protect Earth (New York, NY: Forge, Tom Doherty & Associates, 
2006), 217. 
10
 The classified report was released on January 3, 1999, and the declassified report on May 25, 1999. 
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and control, staging mechanisms and associated kick motors and “smart” dispensers, 
stress & load tests, launch failure anomaly analysis & diagnostics, coupled loads analysis, 
and modeling and simulation.11 Although there is the larger theme of Chinese technology 
stealing through various schemes, the report’s conclusion is that American space 
technology wrongfully ended up in Chinese hands.12 
       On the heels of the Cox Report, was the alleged theft of U.S. nuclear warhead design 
secrets and transfer to the Chinese by Wen Ho Lee, a naturalized U.S. citizen from 
Taiwan and a scientist working at the Los Alamos weapons research facility. Although he 
was arrested in December 1999 and spent nine months in solitary confinement, he was 
eventually cleared of the 59 charges against him except for having to pay a $100 fine for 
“mishandling classified data”.13 Nevertheless, there was a cloud of suspicion over 
anything dealing with Chinese space and missile technology in the late 1990s. 
         Although China’s space program continued to grow despite the Congressional 
backlash after the Cox Report and resulting ban on technology exports to China, its 
unannounced shootdown of an inactive weather satellite on January 11, 2007, by a 
directascent Kinetic-Kill-Vehicle (KKV), resurrected ill feelings of how China was 
behaving and why everyone should be suspicious of its growing space aspirations. The 
use of ASATs for space control or space warfare is not a new topic and has been written 
about extensively.14 However, China was never seriously mentioned until the turn of the 
                                                 
11
 Christopher Cox, U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with People’s Republic 
 of China (Washington D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on U.S. National Security 
  and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, 1999), Ch. 4, 225-232; Ch.5, 2-5, 
  76-84. 
12
 For a rebuttal to the Cox Report, see Stanford University’s Center for International Security and 
Cooperation (Alastair Iain Johnston, et al.), see: http://iisdb.stanford.edu/pubs/10331/cox.pdf. The Cox 
Committee Rebuttal to the “Stanford Assessment,” as well as the Stanford “response” to the Cox rebuttal 
are also conveniently located at: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~johnston/cox.html. 
13
 A copy of the 59-count indictment can be viewed at: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/lee_indict.html. Also see Paul Fahri, “U.S., Media Settle with Wen Ho 
Lee,” Washington Post, June 3, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ 
content/article/2006/06/02/AR2006060201060.html (accessed November 27, 2009). He sued the 
government for supposedly leaking sources and violating his privacy to the media, and was awarded $1.6 
million in damages in June 2006. For a criticism of the media’s role in the Wen Ho Lee case, see Robert 
Scheer’s, “No Defense: How the ‘New York Times’ Convicted Wen Ho Lee,” in The Nation, October 23, 
2000, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20001023/scheer. Lee also co- authored a book about his ordeal, My 
Country Versus Me: The First-Hand Account by the Los Alamos Scientist Who Was Falsely Accused of 
Being a Spy (New York, NY: Hyperion, 2003). 
14
 See Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and James A. Schear, eds., Seeking Stability In Space: Anti-Satellite 
Weapons and the Evolving Space Regime (Lanham, MD: Aspen Strategy Group and University Press of 
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century when reports about its research and development of anti-space doctrine came to 
the forefront. 
        The RAND Corporation under Project Air Force published a recent study on China’s 
“antiaccess strategies” that specifically mentioned “attacks on satellites” as part of a 
potential Chinese military strategy to counter U.S. military superiority.15 Although the 
ASAT test demonstrated only a capability to strike a satellite in low-earth orbit (LEO), 
this would enable China to hit U.S. imagery intelligence satellites, which were one of the 
top priority targets based on RAND’s assessment.16 
       Beyond a direct-ascent Kinetic Kill Vehicle (KKV), are have been additional 
writings on other aspects of a potential Chinese anti-space program, including ground-
based lasers, micro-satellites or parasite satellites, as well as nuclear warhead-generated 
high-altitude electromagnetic pulses to disable enemy satellites.17 In general, the defense 
industry-related articles tend to paint any Chinese progress in space as a menacing threat. 
Even China’s wellpublicized Shenzhou human space program has come under scrutiny as 
actually serving as a cover for reconnaissance purposes.18 
         Despite some of the military and national security concerns, the focus of this thesis 
is on how China is using space as a “soft power” tool in International Relations (IR) and 
whether Washington is miscalculating the main direction of China’s threat to U.S. space 
policy and strategy. To that end, Joan Johnson-Freese notes that one purpose of space 
programs is “techno-nationalism,” which she defines as, “using technology to build 
                                                                                                                                                 
America, 1987); Steven J Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power 
(Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2001); Colonel Susan M. Puska, ed., People’s Liberation 
Army After Next (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 2000); Jeffrey 
G. Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2007). 
15
 Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin Pollpeter, Entering the 
Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2007), 57-58. 
16
 Ibid. 59. 
17
 Stacey Solomone, “China’s Space Program: The Great Leap Upward,” Journal of Contemporary China 
(Vol. 15, No. 47, May 2006):316-317; Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “Space to Manoevre – Satellite Attack Upsets 
U.S. Space Supremacy,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (March 01, 2007); Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic 
Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 1999). For world reaction to ASAT test, see WMD Insights. “Special Report: Chinese Anti-
satellite Weapon Test – The Shot Heard ‘Round the World,” WMD Insights: Issues and Viewpoints in the 
International Media, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I13/I13_EA1_SP_PRC_ASAT.htm (accessed 
December 21, 2009). 
18
 Desmond Ball, “China Pursues Space-Based Intelligence Gathering Capabilities,” Jane’s Intelligence 
Review (December 01, 2003). 
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stature and power perceptions”.19 Clearly, a country that is able to build its own satellites, 
launch them, and then control them to exploit the space domain is among an elite group 
of nations and enjoys higher prestige than those that cannot. Especially for nations 
wishing to become “players in space” and “build knowledge-based societies, technology 
development…attract more global information technology jobs…and link [rural] villages 
and cities,”20 some kind of national investment in space is absolutely essential. 
          As China dips into its state resources to pursue its space program, there are natural, 
tangible benefits that will result. Job creation, stimulation of national interest in science, 
math, aerospace, and astronomy, and “spin-off” technologies resulting from space 
program research and development are but a few. However, there are more intangible, yet 
very real, benefits as well. First, a successful space program, especially a manned-space 
version, brings heightened global prestige as well increased internal credibility and 
prowess to the supporting scientific and technical communities. Johnson-Freese likens 
the Chinese effort to the American success enjoyed during the heyday of the Apollo 
program, and adds that “a successful demonstration…in manned spaceflight carr [ies] 
significant geopolitical implications…technology advancements can be viewed to 
indicate national stature, and potentially, power”.21 
      Johnson-Freese follows this theme in another work, stating that “space is one of the 
most globalized aspects of world commerce,”22 inferring that non-space players are 
behind the power curve in the increasingly globalized world. Specifically addressing 
China, Johnson-Freese notes that China wants to develop space capabilities “as part of 
globalization efforts and to send a techno-nationalist message regionally and globally”.23 
        The concept of “techno-nationalism” has some parallels to Joseph Nye’s term “soft 
power,” which he defines as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather 
than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, 
                                                 
19
 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 11. 
20
 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset, 169, 202. 
21
 Ibid., 11. 
22
 Johnson-Freese, “Strategic Communication with China: What Message About Space?” 44. 
23
 Ibid., 52. 
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political ideals, and policies”.24 Nye sees China’s efforts in space as a way to “help 
increase its prestige and attraction”.25 For China’s space program to attract countries in 
Africa and South America, some measure of soft power may have been usefully applied. 
         Joshua Kurlantzick cites as growing evidence of Chinese soft power the “large 
official delegations from…Brazil and various African nations that now regularly visit 
China at the government’s invitation”26 as well as “in older groupings like the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] and in newer pan-Asian institutions, 
like the East Asia summit”.27 From a space perspective, this was manifested initially in 
the creation of the Asia-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and 
Applications (AP-MCSTA) and then its subsequent transformation into the Asia-Pacific 
Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), conveniently headquartered in Beijing.28 
         U.S. Navy Commander John Klein assesses China’s rise in space as primarily 
associated with national power, national strategy, international influence, and world 
prestige. Although his main intent is to use historical maritime strategy to address current 
U.S. space strategy, he notes that as China continues to expand its “celestial lines of 
communication,” it will have a “greater say in how the most desirable communications 
frequencies and geostationary orbital slots are assigned and used,” and thus able to use 
coercive diplomatic influence if needed.29 
         China scholar David M. Lampton also elaborates the argument about China’s 
“underappreciated space program” as one aspect of its power projection, economic 
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development, and more importantly “ideational power”.30 At its foundation, ideational 
power does not involve financial incentives or threats of military force. Rather, it comes 
from “the intellectual, cultural, spiritual, leadership, and legitimacy resources that 
enhance a nation’s capacity to efficiently define and achieve national objectives”.31  
He acknowledges some similarities between “ideational power” and Joseph Nye’s “soft 
power” and Amitai Etzioni’s “normative power,” but adds that his term is broader in the 
sense that it also “includes leadership, human resources, innovation, and culture”.32 Thus 
China’s push into space has intellectual attraction, creates a sense of national unity, can 
help promote economic development and raise standards of living, and can add 
diplomatic legitimacy to China as its participates in international space affairs.33 
       A recent study by Kevin Pollpeter portrays China’s efforts as aimed at taking “a 
leading role in regional space cooperation” and as having the potential for space power to 
contribute to China’s comprehensive national power, as well as to “advance China’s 
diplomatic interests with oil-rich countries”.34 
 He devotes considerable effort to documenting the rise of Chinese commercial space 
prowess and how that will challenge American military, political, commercial, and 
economic interests. 
         Janie Hulse highlights the gradual pullout of American clout in Argentina and its 
subsequent replacement with Chinese technical assistance and influence. She underscores 
the threat to the United States manifested in China’s desire cooperate with Brazil on spy 
satellite technology, as well as Western hemispheric space tracking facilities, which 
would give China extremely convenient monitoring of U.S. satellites and improved 
imagery of North America.35 Although she also focuses on the telecommunications 
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industry, she nonetheless sees the international commercial space arena in Central and 
South America as a vital industry where America’s preeminence may be waning. 
 
     3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
         This thesis pursues both historical and political science methodologies in this thesis. 
By pursuing a “blended” approach, I mean it first examines the history of the Chinese 
space program briefly, concentrating on Beijing’s initial forays into cooperative 
commercial and scientific ventures with other nations. It then highlights the current 
political science debate over the nature of the Chinese “threat” in space, which most 
analysts have assumed to be centered on hard-power and military dimensions. It then 
investigates possible concerns on the “soft power” side and on China’s motivations in 
forging international partnerships through space projects and joint scientific endeavors. 
The thesis looks at the parallel developments in China’s “soft power” approaches to 
commercial space, sketching the rise of AP-MCSTA and APSCO, space initiatives in 
ASEAN, as well as its diplomatic outreach through space ventures with Russia, and 
countries in the European Union, Africa and South America. 
       Additionally, this thesis examines the various United Nations space-related 
organizations, treaties, and conventions of which China is a member and signatory nation. 
The history of these organizations, as well as the treaties, helps to sketch the rise of 
Chinese influence in space through international fora. As noted by CNA China Space 
analyst Dean Cheng, China did not have a say regarding the formation of arms control 
and Missile Control Technology Regime (MCTR) rules, but has “sought a seat at the 
table on space issues, in order to help establish the fundamental ‘rules of the road’.36 
Exploring the role and contributions that Chinese have made through the United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) Regional Space 
Application Programme (RESAP) is useful, especially in tracking Chinese soft power 
efforts and ability to influence as well as “[determine] the international terms and 
conditions for space operations”.37 
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         Finally, this thesis uses both the 2000 and 2006 PRC State Council White Papers on 
space as baselines for what China has officially stated in regard to the intentions of its 
space program. Since information on most international space launches and projects that 
the Chinese are involved in is available through open media reporting, the thesis uses 
extensive open press reporting as an additional source of information. 
 
    4. OVERVIEW OF PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
         Two questions lay behind the purpose of this thesis. First, why are space programs 
important and what is China doing to leverage them? A growing number of nations 
recognize the advantages of space applications. From the tangible aspects of Presition 
Navigation and Timing (PNT), remote sensing, weather forecasting, monitoring for 
natural disasters, and telecommunications (satellite TV, cell phones, etc.) to the more 
abstract aspects of political prestige, “soft power,” and techno-nationalism, more 
countries are investing in both commercial and scientific space projects. China is not 
simply standing idly by, but instead is promoting itself as a provider of these services to 
others, despite short-term economic costs. Part of the thesis problem is to assess why 
China has chosen certain nations in Asia as well as others far outside of its Asian 
backyard to market these services to and what it hopes to gain from them. 
        Second, is America’s comparative advantage in commercial space at risk to China 
by failing to compete effectively in these areas? Ever since the release of the Cox 
Commission’s report in 1999, and the subsequent addition of International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations (ITAR) stipulations specifically against exporting satellites and launch 
vehicles, the United States has suffered significant consequences, both politically and 
economically. Joan Johnson-Freese says that Washington is sending the wrong strategic 
communication message about space, in particular that the United States is loath to admit 
that it “no longer owns space” and cannot accept that “other countries may want to use 
space for both civil and military purposes”38. With America snubbing China’s desire to 
join the International Space Station (ISS), yet extending the same invitation to South 
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Korea and Brazil, it seems that the message is more politically motivated than a question 
of whether or not either nation can provide logistics or financing for the project, or even 
poses a potential military risk. Part of this thesis will explore China’s ventures with 
nations that are opening their doors and actively seeking space project cooperation, often 
denied by the United States. 
         The preliminary questions that the thesis assesses are:   
         •      How is China using its space capabilities as a strategic asset in furthering its  
                 national interests? These may include working with nations that can provide  
                 access to oil reserves to feed growing Chinese demands from its civilian and  
                 industrial sectors. 
        •       How is Beijing using its “soft power” and space capabilities to advance its  
                 international prestige through cooperative, bilateral, and multilateral space  
                 projects? Is it purposefully playing up its role as a responsible space-faring  
                 nation through participation in relevant United Nations space organizations,  
                 regional organizations like Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization  
                (APSCO), and by signing important space-related United Nations (UN)  
                 treaties? 
       •        Is China pursuing a strategy of creating long-term partnerships through space  
                 that may reduce American influence in Asia, Africa, and South America and    
                 that may even expand to the point that U.S. interests are compromised,  
                 degraded, or even isolated? 
        •       Is the United States in danger of mischaracterizing the motivations and  
                 rationales behind China’s space program and, as a result, pursuing  
                 counterproductive policies that actually create incentives for other countries to  
                 side with China against American interests in space? 
    
 5. IMPORTANCE AND RELEVANCE TO U.S. POLICY 
     When one mentions “China” and “space” in the same sentence, most people proceed 
along several basic lines of thought. Some think of the Chinese ASAT test on January 11, 
2007, and view Chinese forays into space as hostile and menacing mainly to American 
military interests. Others recall the Loral-Hughes “scandal” and the alleged transfer of 
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sensitive U.S. missile technology to China’s strategic rocket forces. Still others think of 
China’s growing interest in manned space flight and lunar exploration as it develops its 
respective Shenzhou and Chang’E programs. However, very few people acknowledge 
China’s commercial space ventures with Nigeria, Venezuela, and France or of the space-
related scientific connections China has forged with England’s Surrey Space Center and 
the European Space Agency (ESA) through the Dragon I/II and Double Star programs. 
       China’s space program goes far beyond just military counterspace applications, 
manned space aspirations, and lunar exploration endeavors. Its pursuit of both 
commercial and scientific international space ventures constitutes a small, yet growing, 
percentage of the global space launch and related space satellite service industry and also 
highlights China’s willingness to cooperate with nations far away from Asia for political 
and strategic purposes. Thus, the importance lies in understanding how China, through 
greater cooperation in space-related ventures, is establishing long-term partnerships that 
may constitute a threat either to counter or even isolate the United States and enhance 
China’s “soft power,” amongst both key American allies as well as some developing 
nations in U.S. backyard. An appropriate U.S. response, however, may not lie in the 
military arena, but instead in a revival of both past U.S. space outreach efforts as well as 
more business-friendly export control policies. 
 
    6. STRACTURE OF THE CHAPTERS  
        To understand the importance of the space medium, it is necessary to understand the 
background of why countries have space programs in the first place. Chapter I describe 
the conceptual framework of “soft power”. Thus, Chapter II first covers the strategic 
nature of space systems and how the growth of space-faring nations potentially reflects 
trends of techno-nationalism, “soft power,” as well as a desire to take full advantage of 
the space domain, and then sketches some of the motivations and current capabilities of 
the Chinese space program. Chapter III assesses China’s space program from 
commercial, scientific, and government legitimacy perspectives and focuses on their role 
in China’s domestic development of space-based soft power. Chapter IV focuses on 
China’s rise internationally, and breaks down China’s space outreach efforts by major 
world regions, concluding with an analysis of the Sino-U.S. relationship in space. In the 
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end the conclusion by assessing U.S. space policy and strategy. It recommends a specific 
course of remedial action for U.S policy to help promote American soft power in space as 
well as to shape China’s rise as a space-faring nation in a positive direction. 
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CHAPTER I: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF “SOFT POWER” 
         The basic concept of power in the most general terms refers to the ability of 
influencing the behavior of others to achieve the outcome one desires through coercion, 
inducement or attraction. Governments have forever utilized their military and economic 
might to achieve investment national goals and in turn increase their power.  
         The “soft power” concept was initially defined on scientific and theoretical levels 
by the American political scientist, Harvard University professor Joseph Nye, based on 
the United States foreign policy to maintain its positive image in the world and to 
promote the best features of American culture and its social achievements. There are 
many controversial and differing opinions concerning Nye’s concept of soft power which 
have lead to some confusion in our understanding of what soft power actually is. To 
explain this different way of understanding the idea of soft power, I will discuss a 
specific how China's Soft Power is transforming the world, focuses on how China uses its 
soft power—culture, investment, academia, foreign aid, public diplomacy— to influence 
other countries in the developing world, which clearly enunciates its goal as soft power. 
Whereas Nye excluded aid and formal diplomacy from his soft power, in Asia, the idea 
of soft power implies all elements outside the security realm including investment and aid. 
Countries like China have identified and developed conscious strategies to enhance their 
soft power. The confusion arises because economic resources can produce both hard and 
soft power behavior. As Walter Russell Mead has argued, “economic power is sticky 
power; it seduces as much as it compels…A set of economic institutions and 
policies…attracts others into our system and makes it hard for them to leave.” A 
successful economy is an important source of attraction. Sometimes in real world 
situations, it is difficult to distinguish what part of an economic relationship is comprised 
of hard and soft power.39 
        The first section of this chapter examines the concept and definition of “soft power”, 
it relates to attraction and public diplomacy. The second section of chapter provides the 
analysis carried out by Beijing policy of “soft power”, takes into account the basic 
mechanisms of the classical concept of forming favorable image of the country in the 
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world and examination of China's "peaceful rise" by way of soft power. Thus, under the 
“classical concept” refers to the concept of which the state intended to constitute the task 
of global geopolitical nature and have the resources to do so. Among the mechanisms it 
can be noted, a conducting various activities of cultural nature, which would have been 
the most positive features of Chinese culture with an emphasis on the achievement of 
China (economic) in recent years. To the other hand, cooperation in providing assistance 
in economic and social sphere, health, education, provision of humanitarian assistance, 
holding on the world arena those strategic partnerships in space activities in particularly 
how China using space as a diplomatic tool.  
 
I. 1. DEFINITION AND SOURCES OF “SOFT POWER” 
        In 1990, Joseph Nye published a book which first popularized the term “soft power”, 
referring primarily to ways in which a nation’s cultural resources constitute a form of 
power that can enhance or even substitute for military and economic strength. In 
simplistic terms, Nye explained:  
“The basic concept of power is the ability to influence others to get them 
to do what you want. There are three major ways to do that: one is to 
threaten them with sticks; the second is to pay them with carrots; the third 
is to attract them or co-opt them, so that they want what you want. If you 
can get others to be attracted, to want what you want, it costs you much 
less in carrots and sticks.”  
            
        In an environment of multiple transnational linkages and changing nature of power, 
the tools of effective diplomacy include not only “soft power” is a term used in 
international relations theory to describe the ability of a political body, such as a state, to 
indirectly influence the behavior or interests of other political bodies through cultural or 
ideological means. Professor Joseph Nye remains the most prominent proponent, in a 
1990 book, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, strengthened by 
his Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004), and further elaborated in 
The Power of Lead (2008). While its usefulness as a descriptive theory has not gone 
unchallenged, soft power has since entered popular political discourse as a way of 
distinguishing the subtle effects of culture, values and ideas on others' behavior from 
more direct coercive measures, such as military action (hard power) or economic 
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incentives. In the words of Joseph Nye, “soft power” emanates from three resources: “a 
state’s culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (where it lives 
up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (where they are seen as 
legitimate and having moral authority).”40 In other words, a country has more soft power 
if its culture, values and institutions incite admiration and respect in other parts of the 
world. It uses an attraction to shared values, and the justness and duty of contributing to 
the achievement of those values. The success of soft power heavily depends on the 
actor’s reputation within the international community, as well as the flow of information 
between actors. Thus, soft power is often associated with the rise of globalization and 
neoliberal international relations theory. Popular culture and media is regularly identified 
as a source of soft power, as is the spread of a national language, or a particular set of 
normative structures; a nation with a large amount of soft power and the good will that 
engenders it inspire others to acculturate, avoiding the need for expensive hard power 
expenditures.  
        By contrast, Kurlantzick includes China's trade and overseas investment in his 
definition of soft power. As Kurlantzick points out, soft power has changed. "For the 
Chinese, soft power means anything outside of the military and security realm, including 
not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and 
diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations—
Ney’s carrots and sticks."41  
       There are many definitions of soft power, but basically, when the Chinese 
government talks about its new soft power in the world, it means all power outside of the 
military sphere, including diplomacy, aid, investment, and economic tools. Quoting from 
Nye, Kurlantzick describes soft power as resting on the ability “to shape the preferences 
of others…It is leading by example and attracting others to do what you want. If I can get 
you to do what I want, then I do not have to use carrots or sticks to make you do it.”42 
         Soft power can be developed through relations with allies, economic assistance and 
cultural exchanges which in turn would result in a more favorable public opinion. 
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Therefore, soft power can be either ‘High’ i.e. targeted at elites or ‘Low’ i.e. targeted at 
the broader public.43  
 
I. 2. “SOFT POWER” WITH CHINESES CHARACTERISTICS  
          The concept of soft power has made a strong impression in China too. Joseph 
Nye’s theory on “soft power” has captured the imagination of Chinese scholars and the 
general public and stimulated a lively debate on how to increase and employ China’s soft 
power. In this case, a very remarkable experience in China, which is one of the first 
centers of Asian civilization, using the “soft power” on a global scale. 
           According to Peng Fuchun, National People’s Congress deputy “we should never 
underestimate the importance of building soft power as economic miracle is only one side 
of China's rising in the world area” 44 In light of this, China is expanding its use of 
cultural, educational and diplomatic tools to increase its appeal across the world. China is 
steadily increasing its support for cultural exchanges, sending doctors and teachers to 
work abroad, welcoming students from other nations to study in China, and paying for 
Chinese-language programs abroad. China has established Confucius Institutes with a 
mission to promote the Chinese language, culture and a range of other aspects of learning 
about China, including its business environment. Several of these institutes have already 
been established around the world, in such places as Japan, Australia, Sweden and the 
United States, and Beijing aims eventually to open some 100 of them.45 
Win-win diplomacy aimed at multilateralism, mutually beneficial cooperation and 
the spirit of inclusiveness remains the keystone of China’s foreign relations. China has 
supported its win-win strategy with initiatives like signing the Southeast Asia Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation and committing itself to creating a Code of Conduct on the South 
China Sea.46  China’s embrace of free trade and promotion of the idea that it will become 
a source of foreign direct investment strengthens its image and the success of its 
developmental model holds significant appeal for many Southeast Asian countries. China 
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has been using its aid as one of its soft power strategies. The diplomatic component, 
among other actions, involves befriending resource-rich nations that the U.S. and others 
see as pariahs. With its policy of "non-interference" in the domestic affairs of other 
nations, China counters efforts by the U.S. and others to isolate countries such as Sudan, 
Iran, and Zimbabwe. China also cultivates friendships with nations such as Venezuela 
that currently have unfriendly relations with the United States, but in doing so, it is 
careful not to appear to divert oil supplies from the U.S. market. Relations with 
developing countries, as China's low-key policy toward Venezuela indicates, do not 
trump China's high priority needs to avoid military confrontation and keep the U.S. 
market open to Chinese exports. 
      China has also become more pragmatic. It does not want to directly antagonize the 
U.S. or poke a finger in its eye; it wants to still have a good relationship with the U.S. but 
pursue these other strategies at the same time. For instance, China has a very good 
relationship with Venezuela, whose Hugo Chavez has made stridently anti-U.S. 
statements in many forums, including the U.N. When he did the same in Beijing, China’s 
ambassador to Venezuela immediately told the local press that China did not want to 
associate itself with those statements. 
       Chinese aid to Philippines, Laos and Indonesia has far outnumbered U.S. aid in the 
region. The Chinese government is also gradually increasing its aid to African countries 
under the China- Africa Cooperation Forum. China has also adjusted its diplomacy and 
unlike a decade ago joined the World Trade Organization, contributed more than 3,000 
troops to serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations, become more helpful on non-
proliferation issues (including hosting the six-party talks on North Korea), settled 
territorial disputes with its neighbors, and joined a variety of regional organizations.47  
       As Kurlantzick points out, China's successes in weakening U.S. positions around the 
world are often a direct result of mistakes by the U.S., ranging from unilateralism to its 
failure to even try to understand Middle Eastern societies on their own terms. 
       The "flat world" of globalization, so stridently advocated by Clinton and presidency 
of George W Bush, simply did not create the improved quality of life it promised for 
many Third World countries. Consequently, these countries now view China's model, and 
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China's influence, as the only feasible option they have at their disposal. This is an 
important point for Kurlantzick because without it, an analysis of China's use of soft 
power could too easily descend into predictable condemnations of the country's 
relationship with nefarious dictators and corrupt bureaucracies.  
       These are certainly valid points, and ones Kurlantzick emphasizes, but he does not 
shy away from the fact that the inadequate results of the past 20 years of U.S. soft power 
have created an opening for any competing ideology, of which China's hybridized 
embrace between a centrally planned economy and open market is only the most recent 
and viable alternative: China seems to have enjoyed striking success and poverty 
reduction other developing nations can't help but notice. At the same time, the 
Washington Consensus has failed many developing nations. During the late 1980s and 
the 1990s, many African and Latin American nations opened their economies, slashed 
tariffs, and undertook other painful economic reforms, yet few nations in either Latin 
America or Africa saw their economies take off. Even when these poor regions boosted 
growth, it seemed to have no measurable impact on employment, leaving masses of 
unemployed people willing to try another economic model, and leaders groping for 
answers as well.48  
         After September 11, 2001, the U.S. had its attention understandably focused on the 
threat of terrorism rather than on the implications of turning a blind eye toward China, or 
the shortcomings of unfettered US-led economic globalization. But even had U.S. focus 
on the "global war on terror" been effective, judicious and constructive, the country 
would have vacated some areas where it was exercising its soft power, which would have 
created openings into which China could squeeze. That the U.S. so badly mismanaged the 
post-September 11 world has, among other things, clearly increased China's ability to 
project itself around the world.  
       The exercise to understand China's foreign policy in its yet-infant stages is certainly 
important, but Kurlantzick forcefully reminds us that China is emphasizing soft-power 
strategies because it sees this as the United States' weak point: "In Chinese publications, 
Wang Jisi, one of China's elite intellectuals, noted that America's weakness was its soft 
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power, not its hard power. And after the Iraq war began in 2003, the scholar Biwu Zhang 
found, Chinese authors agreed that America had suffered 'a serious setback in terms of 
soft power."49 
        Space has become another area where China is exerting its soft power. It is 
positioning itself as a space benefactor to the developing world-the same countries in 
some cases, whose natural resources China covets. China not only designed, built and 
launched a satellite oil rich Nigeria but also combined it with a major loan to help pay the 
costs. It has signed a similar contract with Venezuela and is developing an earth 
observation satellite system with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru 
and Thailand. 50 
In addition to serving national security and domestic civilian use of space, 
China’s space activities are also being used as a tool for diplomacy. The nation’s space 
related international cooperation efforts, which began with a bilateral arrangement for 
satellite development, have blossomed to include the establishment of satellite tracking 
stations and a leading role in multilateral frameworks. China’s pursuit of such 
international cooperation is expected to expand in the future, and will likely help the 
nation to secure its necessary supply of resources and energy. In light of this posture and 
China’s growing efforts to provide African nations with official development assistance 
and debt relief, projects like the China-Nigeria partnership in communication satellite 
development and launches can be seen as examples of China’s exploitation of space 
activities as a diplomatic tool. 
       It is highly probable that competition between China and other advanced space-
faring nations will intensify with regard to space development and use in general. The use 
of space is certain to become an increasingly vital element of China’s security and civil 
needs. However, as a nation that operates in the globalized world, China is starting to 
realize that growth in science and technology cannot be achieved outside of that 
environment.  
        China has been quietly making investments in some non-military fields with a view 
to engaging other nations. Space Technology is one area where China is engaging 
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developing nations by providing them assistance to either develop their space program or 
to launch satellites on their behalf. It is establishing linkages in the space arena with 
countries in Africa and South America, including Nigeria, Venezuela, and Brazil. China’s 
ultimate objectives are the natural resources and markets in these parts of the world. 
China is talking its friendship with Pakistan to a higher plane by helping the latter in the 
space field as well. China has also promised Bolivia help in developing its space program 
within three years and in the launch of its first satellite.51 A successful space program, 
especially a manned-space version, brings heightened global prestige as well increased 
internal credibility and prowess to the supporting scientific and technical communities.  
           Joan Johnson-Freese notes that China wants to develop space capabilities “as part 
of globalization efforts and to send a techno-nationalist message regionally and 
globally”.52 
        The concept of “techno-nationalism” has some parallels to Joseph Nye’s term “soft 
power”; Nye sees China’s efforts in space as a way to “help increase its prestige and 
attraction”.53 For China’s space program to attract countries in Africa and South America, 
some measure of soft power may have been usefully applied. 
       As Kurlaznick points out, soft power as it is applicable to China is more than the 
original concept advanced by Nye, as now it is broader in its scope. China perceives soft 
power as anything that is outside of the military and security realm and this includes not 
only popular culture and public diplomacy but also coercive economic and diplomatic 
levers such as aid and investment as well as participation in multilateral organizations-
something that China shied away from in the past.  
        Kurlantzick focuses on China’s pursuit of developing nations in Southeast Asia, 
Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia-areas of the globe that have been alienated in 
one way or another by the U.S. It is here where China succeeds in promoting itself as 
having an effective model for social and economic success and where it turns a blind eye 
to the dictatorial shenanigans, even Kurlantzick makes various suggestions as to how the 
U.S. can respond and as he states, it still enjoys crucial advantages over China, 
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particularly with its military power that if used correctly, can compliment soft power. 
Case in point is its deployment for humanitarian missions such as the tsunami response 
that demonstrated that only the U.S. had sophisticated military to move aid overnight.  
       China is strategically positioning itself as a focal point for all space-related activities, 
from providing financial assistance to manufacturing, and launching facilities for states in 
Asia, Africa and South America. This approach has multiple benefits – an increase in 
China’s global footprint, flow of benefits to the Chinese space industry, experimentation 
with new technologies, and wins friends. The following chapter will explore what soft 
power abilities the major space-faring nations obtain through space activity. It focuses on 
China’s motivation and capabilities. 
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CHAPTER II: CHINESE SPACE MOTIVATIONS AND CAPABILITIES 
        It is easy to understand, given the background of the Cold War and the initial space 
race between the America and then-USSR in the 1950s and 1960s, why space programs 
have been traditionally regarded as a “hard power” asset. In more recent times, however, 
that hard edge to space power has been continually dulled by the growing number of 
actors (both state-sponsored and private commercial entities) in space and the concurrent 
expansion of soft power applications of space programs. This chapter examines the 
reasons why many states are now entering space and what soft power abilities they obtain 
through space activity. It then focuses on China’s specific motivations and capabilities. 
 
II. 1. SPACE PROGRAMS: ONLY A SUPERPOWER LUXURY? 
         Access to space was at one time the hallowed and exclusive ground of the 
superpowers: the United States and the former Soviet Union. Looking back several 
decades, only these two large, powerful states with financial and scientific resources 
could muster the required effort to develop the necessary technical acumen to research, 
test, develop, and field rocket and satellite technology. Currently, access to space is only 
a matter of money and interest. Much of the technology can be obtained relatively 
inexpensively, and there are a host of commercial and state enterprises worldwide that are 
competing to help other countries gain access to space. 
       A recent report by the FUTRON Corporation highlights several emerging space 
trends with international impact, for example: 
       •        Rise of space as a global information and communication environment; 
       •        Growth of commercial space (e.g., cheaper boosters, more launch service  
                providers); 
       •        Introduction of “NewSpace” (e.g., space tourism, commercial spaceports); 
       •        Advancement of Asian leaders (specifically referring to the Chinese, 
                Indian, and Japanese space programs); and 
       •        Globalization of space participation.54 
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      Space-based telecommunications are no longer a luxury of the superpowers, but a 
commodity that many nations have either developed on their own or bought into through 
partnerships or broader consortiums. This is compounded by the fact that more nations 
have started up their own space agencies and are developing new vehicles and booster 
rockets. The last bullet on the “Globalization of space participation” captures this concept 
very well in its follow-on text: 
 
Space is no longer the exclusive province of a handful of countries. The 10 
leaders [major space-faring nations] are now joined by scores of others with some 
degree of space involvement—whether a national satellite, an astronaut flown by 
a partner nation, membership in an intergovernmental space organization, or 
participation in a collaborative space project. From Colombia’s Libertad satellite 
to Nigeria’s Nigcomsat, from Australia’s Hyshot suborbital test to Saudi Arabia’s 
Riyadh Space Research Institute, countries from all six populated continents now 
participate in space.55 
       
 Given the upward trend for space activities, how would “country X” get started in space? 
What typical milestones should be reached? Nicolas Peter, in his study on the “new 
geography of civilian space activities,” suggests a four-stage evolution for a nation’s 
space program, as follows: 
        •        Purchase satellites from other countries; 
        •        Develop space systems in cooperation with other countries; 
        •        Develop satellite systems independently; and 
        •        Disseminate knowledge of satellite development to other countries.56 
        Looking at China’s progress in space since 1970, it seems to be following these four 
stages in fairly close order. China bought much of the high-tech transponder technology 
for its Dongfanghong-1 (“East is Red”) communication satellite from West Germany. 
Sanctions resulting from international condemnation of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 
forced China to look at non-Western assistance for space technology, and it chose to 
partner with Brazil on the China-Brazil Earth Resource Satellite (CBERS, or Ziyuan for 
                                                 
55
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“resource” in Chinese) in the mid-1990s. In addition to the CBERS program, China has 
had an ongoing partnership with the European Space Agency involving the Double 
Star/Cluster project and Dragon I/II projects, which focus on studying Earth’s magnetic 
belts and magnetosphere, and various applications of remote sensing, respectively.57 
       Although its domestic satellite manufacturing may not have reached the level of 
sophistication that Washington and Moscow enjoy, Beijing nonetheless has produced its 
own satellites and launch vehicles with marked success (discussed below). China 
currently has ongoing projects for launching satellites and training engineers and space 
operators from Nigeria and Venezuela.58 Clearly, according to Peter’s evolutionary 
progression model for national space agencies, China has stepped through all four stages 
and continues to operate in each one of them to this day. But to what end? 
 
II. 2. MOTIVATIONS AND EMERGING CAPABILITIES OF THE CHINESE 
         SPACE PROGRAM 
         According to the United Nation’s Office for Outer Space Affairs, there are more 
than 50 countries that have national space programs.59 Since the launch of Sputnik in 
1957 and Yuri Gagarin’s first flight into space back in 1961, the price tag of getting your 
own slice of the space market has been falling. As noted space historian Howard E. 
McCurdy commented, “Space, at least Earth’s orbit, is no longer the exclusive domain of 
the few.”60 Louis Friedman, who is the executive director of the Pasadena-based 
Planetary Society, echoes similar comments about why more countries are getting into 
space. Once a country has its own satellite in orbit, he asserted, they “immediately 
become a player on the world stage”.61 He added countries that aspire to “be an economic 
                                                 
57
 Chinese cooperation with ESA is covered in more detail in Chapter IV. For more information on the 
Double Star program, see: http://sci.esa.int/science-e/www/area/index.cfm?fareaid=70 (accessed December 
29, 2009). Information on the Dragon program can be found at: http://earth.esa.int/dragon/ (accessed 
December 29, 2009). 
58
 China successfully launched versions of their DHF-class communications satellite for each country, 
NIGCOMSAT-1 and VENESAT-1, respectively. China’s international space cooperation is more 
thoroughly addressed in Chapter IV. 
59
 United Nations Office for Outer space (UNOOSA) See 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/OOSA/index.html, however it is important to note that few nations possess 
a truly independent launch capability. 
60
 Peter Pae, “Third World Sets Sights on Space,” Los Angeles Times (October 14, 2003): A1. 
61
 Friedman. 
27 
 
and technological power in their region…going to space is a way to show that.”62 The 
Cold War, which had “limited space cooperation to ‘intra-bloc’ cooperation,” has ended, 
and there are “new and emerging relations among civilian space entities in the post-Cold 
War era”.63 Thus, it should come as no surprise that China, with its growing economic 
power and burgeoning scientific and technology capacities would be interested in 
exploring the possibilities of outer space and expanding its cooperation with other 
nations. 
          In October 2006, China released a key document that outlined its policy regarding 
space, entitled, “China’s Space Activities in 2006.” This white paper is divided into five 
sections, covering its aims and principles, a review of the last five years in space, its 
plans for the next five years, its development policies as well as international exchanges 
and cooperation.64 While there is an emphasis on foreign cooperation at the end, there are 
also plans for China to set the foundation to become a “commercial space 
superpower…through launching dozens of domestic satellites on improved boosters”.65 
         Looking at the other major Asian space contenders, to include Japan, India, and 
now an ambitious South Korea, none have been able to match China’s success either in 
its manned program or in its launch record. The following table shows China’s space 
activity compared with the other major space-faring nations: 
                           
Table 1: Reported Spaceflight Launched by Country, 2003-200766 
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      Figure 1 below shows future predicted launches by the Chinese government and 
covers their domestic communications satellite launches as well as support for both their 
lunar exploration and manned space launch programs: 
 
Figure 1: Chinese Government Launches (1970-2021): Future Launch Projection from    
                Futron’s ASCENT Study67 
        With 115th of its Long March rockets in December, China achieved 11 successful 
flights in 2008, surpassing the number predicted above by four launches and establishing 
a new domestic record. It is also interesting to note that China also surpassed the total 
number of U.S. launches (10) for 2008.68 
        The other study by FUTRON covered the world’s top 10 leading nations involved in 
space activities, and analyzed them “using 40 measures of government spending, human 
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expertise, and the private sector”.69 The resulting document became known as a “Space 
Competitive Index,” with one telling illustration as follows: 
 
Figure 2: FUTRON Corporation’s Space Competiveness Index, 200870 
         
          China was specifically highlighted as, “emerging as a major space power with 
ambitious and visionary goals backed by heavy investment, centralized decision making, 
and techno-nationalistic programs”.71 Although it is clear from Figure 2 that China has a 
way to go before it comes close to the United States, it’s also noteworthy that it enjoys a 
fourth-place ranking ahead of U.S. space allies Canada and Japan. 
        A more recent study by FUTRON covered the same world’s top 10 leading nations 
involved in space activities, and analyzed them “using 50 individual metrics that 
represent the underlying economic determinants of space competitiveness measures of 
government, human capital, and industry.”72 The resulting document became known as a 
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2009 Space Competitive Index: Total Aggregate Scores by Country, with one telling 
illustration as follows: 
 
Figure 3: 2009 Space Competitiveness Index: Total Aggregate Scores by Country73 
 
        The United States remains the current leader in space competitiveness, but its 
relative position has declined marginally based on increased activity by other space faring 
nations. The U.S. still leads in each of the major categories: government, human capital, 
and industry, however, its comparative advantage is narrowing across all categories. 
       Japan posted major gains between the 2008 and 2009 Space Competiveness Index 
(SCI) metric evaluations, due to substantial changes in its space strategy as well as its 
new space law. This resulted in the country jumping from the seventh position in the 
2008 SCI to the fourth position in the 2009 SCI. 
       India had a strong year of space activity, registering double-digit improvements in 
government metric scores, but lagged in industry scoring. 
       China posted gains of nearly 10 percent in SCI points overall, fueled by government 
activity and metrics, but fell behind Japan in its overall ranking. The transparency of the 
Chinese environment remains a hurdle for the country, which publicly seeks greater 
international cooperation and commercial activity. 
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      For 2009, I found that Asian space powers -- China, India and Japan -- are in close 
competition with one another, even as they challenge traditional leaders such as Europe, 
Russia and the U.S. 
       China's space program is poised to surge ahead at a brisk pace in 2010. In fact, over 
the 12 months, China's activities in space may be such that when all is said and done, 
2010 could well rank as one of China's top years thus far in terms of the total number and 
variety of missions launched. Part of the reason for this is the sense, created by reports 
that two or three major Chinese space programs are running behind schedule, that China 
has some catching up to do. This might help to explain the rapid sequence of launches of 
the Yaogan 7 and Yaogan 8 remote sensing satellites by China in December 2009. 
       After 2009, which is best described as relatively uneventful with the exception of the 
successful completion of the Chang'e-1 lunar mission last March and the dual Yaogan 
launches, 2010 could prove to be exciting for observers of China's space program. 
       The decision of Obama administration to scrap Nasa's plans to return to the moon 
leave China well placed to become the second nation to land humans on the lunar surface. 
"The moon is an obvious target for China and they could be there in 2020," said Ken 
Pounds, professor of space science at Leicester University, England. 74 
       Chinese Lunar Exploration Program, also known as Chang'e program is a program of 
robotic explorations and human missions to the Moon undertaken by CNSA. 
According to CNSA, the program will go through three phases: 
•  Phase I: Orbital mission Chang'e 1 & 2 -- Chang'e 1 was the first to be     
                  successfully launched as scheduled on October 24, 2007 and Chang’e 2 is an  
                  un-manned lunar probe scheduled for launch in October 2010. It will be  
                  China's second lunar orbiter, part of the first phase of the Chinese Lunar                    
                   Exploration Program. 
•  Phase II: Soft lander --Chang'e 3 these missions were originally planned for 
2012 requiring the use of the CZ-5/E heavy launch vehicle. 
•  Phase III: Automated sample return Chang'e 4--the third phase of the lunar     
                  exploration program is planned for 2017 with the use of the CZ-5/E heavy  
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                  launch vehicle. After that a manned lunar landing might be possible in 2025– 
                  2030.75 
 
II. 3. CHINA’S SPACE FACILITIES 
         As clearly illustrated from the above figures, China is going to be a major (and 
increasing) space launch provider in the future. Where will all this occur? China currently 
has three main facilities to conduct space launches, with a fourth site (Wenchang) under 
construction on Hainan Island just off China’s southern coast. Table 2 breaks down each 
site’s location and type of launch capability it provides: 
 
 
Table 2: Overview of China’s Space Launch Centers76 
 
        The addition of Wenchang was specifically designed to give the Chinese a favorable 
site close to the Equator for geosynchronous launches. Since it will be a coastal facility, it 
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will be able to take advantage of ship-borne rocket stages and avoid having to negotiate 
China’s cramped domestic railways. Wenchang will also likely serve as the permanent 
launch facility for the Long March-5 heavy booster when it comes on line. 
       This new design, which will be able to boost 25-ton payloads (lunar program 
projects, large satellites, and space station modules), “China’s fourth space center, 
Wenchang, will be put into service between 2014 and 2015, not in 2013 as it was 
previously announced, the CCTV channel,” 77 will also compete for launching 
commercial satellites on the international market.  
 
II. 4. CHINA’S SPACE TRACKING CAPABILITY 
         Beyond the ability to launch a satellite into orbit, it is even more important to be 
able to manipulate and control it to actually derive any benefit from it. Otherwise, it will 
be just another piece of floating debris in space and of no use to anyone. In order to 
establish satellite control, a network of Telemetry, Tracking and Control (TT&C) stations 
are required. This is especially critical for a manned-space program where a global 
network is needed to ensure consistent communications all at times with the capsule. 
Currently, China operates 10 ground observation sites and TT&C stations in China, and 
has agreements with other nations (France, Norway, Sweden, for example) to 
complement their domestic capability. It also employs a small fleet of space tracking 
ships, called “Yuan Wang” (literally, “far observe”), that “conduct surveying and 
controlling operations for spaceship’s orbit transfer and maintenance, attitude adjustment, 
and video and audio transmission”.78 Altogether, China has five Yuan Wang ships in the 
Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian oceans to provide worldwide coverage of its space assets. It 
also recently launched a Tianlian (literally, “heaven/sky link”) satellite that will provide 
improved data relay between its satellites and manned space capsules with its supporting 
ground stations, and help to quickly diagnose any malfunctions that may occur while 
astronauts are on board.79 
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II. 5. CHINA’S MANNED SPACE PROGRAM    
         China began “Project 921” in 1992 in an earnest effort to send humans into space. 
It is somewhat mirrored on the U.S. and Soviet manned space programs and divided into 
three distinct phases: 
•   Phase I: Technology demonstration; launch Shenzhou 1-5 to test capsule        
                   design, highlighted by Lt Col Yang Liwei becoming the first Chinese man in    
                   space on October 15, 2003.80 
•   Phase II: Docking, maneuvering, extra-vehicular activities (EVA); launch    
        Shenzhou spacecraft 6-14 to establish space station and docking capability;       
        practice spacewalk activities.  
        The TianGong ("Heavenly Place") will have two docking ports:  
        TianGong 1 is scheduled for late 2010. ShenZhou 8 will then be launched            
        unmanned to add to the station. Manned missions will then follow with  
        ShenZhou   9 and ShenZhou 10;  
        TianGong 2 is projected for 2013 with ShenZhou 11 and ShenZhou 12    
        providing crews in 2013/14.  
        This would be followed by TianGong 3 in 2015 and ShenZhou 13 and  
        ShenZhou 14 in 2015/16, after that will be upgraded to a cargo spaceship.  
        The cargo spaceship will not only have rendezvous and docking functions, it    
        will provide refueling for the space station.81 
•   Phase III: Establish permanent space station (less defined currently).82 This    
                    is expected to be completed by 2020/2025 timeframe. 
            Project 921 entered its second phase in 2006. The programme was listed among 
the China’s medium- to long-term outline for science & technology development (2006-
2020). The China Human Spaceflight Project Office is responsible for the overall 
management and budgetary concerns of the project. China Aerospace Science & 
Technology Corporation (CASC) is responsible for design and development of the 
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manned spacecraft and launch vehicle. China Academy of Sciences (CAS) is responsible 
for development of the application systems onboard the spacecraft.83  
      The number of sub-systems has increased from 7 in the Project 921 Phase-I to 8 in the 
Project 921 Phase-II. They are: Astronaut System (Project 921-1), Application System 
(Project 921-2), Shenzhou Manned Spacecraft System (Project 921-3), Launch Vehicle 
System (Project 921-4), Launch Site System (Project 921-5), Tracking, Telemetry & 
Command (TT&C) System (Project 921-6), Landing Site System (Project 921-7), and 
Space Lab System (Project 921-8).84 
        China has taken a step-by-step approach in flying its astronauts, mimicking the 
American program along the way. They started with a single-person flight in 2003,     
(Lieutenant Colonel Yang Liwei, China’s First “Taikonaut” in Space) similar to the 
Mercury (1962) single-seat missions. They followed that with a two-person launch in 
2005 for five days, akin to the Gemini missions (1965). In September 2008, they flew a 
three-person crew with a successful spacewalk attempt, akin to the Apollo missions of 
1968. Now, the Chinese are looking to establish a Spacelab-type of orbiting observatory 
to conduct follow-on experiments for an eventual permanently manned space station.85       
 
 II. 6. CHINA’S SATELLITES 
           Table 3, below, provides an overview of the current family of Chinese satellite 
types, their names and functions, orbits, and other comments about each particular 
system. Most started out as direct purchases from abroad or jointly developed with 
another country. However, the recent trend is that many of these, especially those that 
have direct military application, are designed and manufactured solely in China. 
Currently, China ranks fifth in the world in number of satellite payloads in space with 83, 
trailing Russia (1398), the United States (1042), and Japan (123) respectively.86 
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                                     Table 3: Overview of Chinese Satellites87 
         Space is no longer merely the playground of the Cold War superpowers. Nor is it 
anymore about a race between two competing ideologies than a logical response to the 
current global demand for worldwide information and telecommunication services. More 
and more nations see the need to either develop their own capability or buy their way into 
space access. As noted in the 2009 Space Competitiveness Index: 
 
 A convergence of space technologies combined with a divergence of 
space actors—among both national space agencies and commercial space 
companies—is stimulating competition, creating new products and 
services, and driving innovation throughout government, business, and 
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society. As a result of these dramatic and worldwide changes to the 
information and communication landscape, access to space and space 
based assets are no longer viewed as a luxury, but rather as a strategic 
necessity.88 
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CHAPTER III: CHINA’S “SOFT POWER” IN SPACE: DOMESTIC ASPECTS 
        With an understanding of the background of China’s space program and how 
countries seek soft power advantages from their own space programs from the previous 
chapter, this chapter now focuses directly at how China is “selling” its space program 
domestically. It covers China’s space program as a legitimizing tool for the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), how it is played up in order to recruit future space scientists and 
technicians needed to fulfill its ambitions plans for manned space and unmanned Martian 
exploration with Russia, and also highlights some of the domestic applications and spin-
off technologies that it hopes to reap from its space program effort. 
        To date, the Chinese government has only released two white papers concerning its 
space activities, respectively released in 2000 and updated in 2006. In both versions, 
there are clear goals directed at the domestic Chinese audience. The 2000 version, under 
“Aims and Principles,” notes that “the Chinese government has all along regarded the 
space industry as an integral part of the state’s comprehensive development strategy 
(guojia zhengti fazhan zhanlue),” and lists some of the following key principles:89 
        •       Revitalizing the country with science and education; 
        •       [sic] Self-reliance, self-innovation, breakthroughs in space technology on its  
                 own strength (kao ziji de liliang); 
        •       Selecting projects vital to the national economy and social development; and 
        •        Enhancing the social and economic returns of space activities.90 
       This opening section of “Aims and Principles” speaks more to China’s own citizens 
then to an outside audience. While there is brief mention of international cooperation and 
exchanges, the real thrust of this document clearly outlines that China’s space program 
will help it modernize and have stable progress into the 21st century. It calls upon the 
Chinese to blaze this trail mostly on their own, and that they can expect to reap a host of 
benefits from space.          
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        How does China get there from here? Under “Development Concepts,” the White 
Paper outlines several points, to include “speeding up the development of ‘talented 
people in the space industry’ (hangtian rencai), developing space education (fazhan 
hangtian jiaoyu), training qualified personnel, and motivating ‘all levels of society’ 
(shehui gejie) to support the development of the space industry”.91 Clearly, China is 
reaching out to its massive populace to enlist its support for their ambitious space 
program. 
        The White Paper released in 2006 has some upgrades from its 2000 counterpart, but 
still carries a heavy focus on the domestic purposes behind China’s space program. 
The standard ideas of “economic construction (jingji jianshe), development of science 
and technology (keji fazhan)…social progress (shehui jinbu)”92 remain, but a slight 
variation on the 2000 version’s “comprehensive national strategy (zhengti guojia 
zhanlue)” is simply rendered as “comprehensive national strength (zonghe guoli)”.93 In 
strong contrast to the 2000 version, it goes into much greater detail on how China expects 
to make all this happen by listing some specific “Development Policies and Measures”: 
        •        Construct a comprehensive chain of space industry covering satellite  
                  manufacturing, launching services, ground equipment, and operational  
                  services; 
        •        Give support to key laboratories and engineering research centers of space  
                  science and technology; 
        •        Accelerate building of world-class (guoji yiliu) large space corporations; 
        •        Increase funding for space and establish a diverse, multi-channel space  
                  investment system (duoyuanhua duoqudao de hangtian touzi tixi); 
       •         Encourage industrial enterprises, scientific research institutes, commercial  
                  corporations…to play an active part in space activities; and 
        •        Foster talented people for the space industry. In particular, pay attention to  
                  fostering young and highly qualified space scientists and engineers.94 
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        In addition to these two White Papers, the Chinese government also recently 
released a report on “China’s National Defense in 2008.” While most of the White Paper 
focuses on non-space military items, there are several portions that connote space-derived 
capabilities, such as “surveying and mapping, navigation, weather forecasting, 
hydrological observation and space environment support systems have been further 
optimized”.95 Thus, space assets contribute to not only the national economy but also to 
national security as well. 
 
III. 1. SHENZHOU: LEADERSHIP LEGITIMIZER? 
          Out of all the projects one could embark upon regarding space exploration, it is 
manned space that is by far the most expensive and challenging. It is much easier, safer, 
and less risky to send robots, computers, or rodents into space for experiments and 
applications, rather than humans. Given the high cost of entry and other risk factors, it 
can be said the idea of a manned space program is more of a luxury than a real beneficial 
commodity. 
      High costs and unknown risks did not prevent Russia or America from launching 
long-term, expensive, national programs whose sole purpose was to put mankind into the 
heavens. These efforts, however, took place against the backdrop of the Cold War and 
represented the ideological challenge of communism versus capitalism. With the breakup 
of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the current trend of globalization, why 
would China want to put people into space? 
        There are a variety of reasons behind Chinese motivations for manned spaceflight, 
and one of them has a domestic political spin: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Dean 
Cheng comments, “Just because there aren’t elections, doesn’t mean that there are no 
means for the population to express its displeasure”.96 As Peter Aldhous notes: 
 
 Its [the Chinese space program] value in promoting a domestic feel-good 
factor should not be underestimated. Even China’s authoritarian rulers 
have to worry about keeping the country’s billion-strong population 
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reasonably happy. A successful space program could paper over the cracks 
for a while.97 
 
         Noting China’s semi-obsessive behavior with its national image and prestige, as 
well as the CCP’s determination to retain absolute control of the country, William Martel 
and Toshi Yoshihara echo the conventional wisdom: 
Success in China’s manned space program will confer a strong sense of 
national dignity and international status on the country, which are viewed 
as crucial elements to sustain the legitimacy of the Communist Party and 
replace its declining ideological appeal. This intangible yet powerful 
expression of Chinese nationalism partially explains why Beijing invests 
substantial resources into its space program.98 
 
        Morris Jones, an Australian-based space analyst says, “China’s space program 
reflects the power and legitimacy of the Communist Party. They are using manned space 
exploration as a political demonstration of their legitimacy”.99 Jones also notes that the 
launch date of the Shenzhou-7 came on the heels of not only the Beijing Olympics, but 
also close to the conclusion of the Paralympics and Chinese National Day on October 1, 
“making the space mission a nice bridge between two major nationalistic events”.100 
        Roger Launius, senior curator of space history at the National Air and Space 
Museum, focuses more on the symbolism of Chinese technological achievements in his 
perspective: 
It [China’s space program] is a prestige program, no question. I think 
China has entered the [manned spaceflight] arena for the same reasons that 
the United States and Soviet Union did in 1961. It is a demonstration of 
technological virtuosity. It’s a method for showing the world they are 
second to none – which is a very important objective for them.101 
        
David Chandler echoes similar sentiments in his analysis: 
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 The Chinese government expects its manned space program to enhance 
the reputation of China’s high-tech exports, giving it greater diplomatic 
and commercial power. It also sees space technology as critical to 
achieving technological parity with western nations and Japan. 
Specifically, it hopes the manned space programme will raise standards in 
computing, materials science, manufacturing and electronics.102 
 
      With the tumultuous events of the Sichuan earthquake, inflation at decades-high 
levels, a stock market that was at a 21-month low, and seemingly incessant protests over 
government corruption and social injustice, Willy Lam, a Hong Kong-based political 
scientist, said that “a successful Shenzhou-7 mission would help distract China’s 1.3 
billion people from serious economic and social concerns…and will further consolidate 
the [Chinese Communist] Party’s claim that they can get things moving”.103 Lam also 
commented that, “the leadership is banking on patriotism and nationalism to pull them 
through”.104 
        Whether China’s first spacewalk truly “distracted” China’s massive population from 
their woes or not may never be truly known, but the event was certainly maximized for 
full propaganda value. Most newspapers carried “two or three pages devoted to the 
spacewalk,” and tens of millions watched the 15-minute spacewalk live broadcast on 
government-run China Central Television (CCTV), “witnessing the symbolic moment 
when he [Zhai Zhigang] waved a Chinese flag in the weightlessness of low orbit”.105 
Internet blogs were full of patriotic postings, such as, “I’m proud of the great 
achievement of the motherland” and “I’m full of confidence in the future of the 
motherland!”106 
        Quoting the old Chinese idiom of, “When riding a tiger, it is difficult to get off” 
(qihu nanxia), Stacey Solomone notes that: 
The CCP, and subsequently, the PLA would lose face should they 
decide to back off from developing the space program. It would 
appear to as if the CCP and PLA were conceding to the Chinese 
people that they were not advanced as the United States or Russia. 
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The CCP and PLA would risk losing face in the international 
community and popular support at home. The Chinese space 
program provides an ample amount of legitimacy to the CCP 
which so often totes how the space program is aiding the national 
economy and security.107 
         
        Perhaps another reason the Chinese were willing to get into the manned space 
business was confidence in their Shenzhou capsule. Man-rated capsules and their 
associated carrier rockets typically go through long series of expensive testing and 
“dummy launches” to ensure their space worthiness before actual humans are brought on 
board. Usually this requires a dozen flights, but the Chinese sent Col. Yang Liwei on only 
the fifth flight of the Shenzhou.108 Clearly, the Chinese thought their capsule was ready 
and fully man-rated well ahead of the typical schedule for placing humans in new 
spacecraft. 
        Shortly after the successful Shenzhou-5 flight, China not only received a hearty 
congratulatory telegram from the Russian President Vladimir Putin at that time 
emphasizing “Russian-Chinese space cooperation is an important trend [that] will bear 
more fruit for the benefit of our nations,” but the European Space Agency’s director-
general offered congratulations and expressed, “this mission could open a new era of 
wider cooperation in the world’s space community”.109 
        Although much has been written about the Shenzhou being a mere copy of the 
Russian Soyuz design, closer inspection reveals significant differences. Dean Cheng 
noted, “Shenzhou is not so much a copy of the Soyuz as the next evolutionary step”.110 
First, it is larger by approximately 13% (see Figure 5 below), and has an additional 
capability for increased onboard electricity generation. While the Soyuz used only one 
main engine and a backup, the Shenzhou boasts four separate engines.  
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Figure 4: Russian Soyuz, Chinese Shenzhou, and U.S. Orion Capsules Comparison111 
 
           Perhaps most significant in its design was the placing of additional solar panels 
and a guidance system on the orbital module, “…allowing it to remain on orbit as an 
autonomous satellite. This could provide a target for rendezvous and docking practice, 
and over time, several modules could be linked as part of a developing space station”.87 
 
III. 2. AMBITIONS FOR THE MOON, MARS & A SPACE STATION 
 
          Shooting for the Moon 
          China is not just resting on its laurels of becoming only the third nation in history 
to successfully send someone to space, but also has plans for lunar exploration, research 
on Mars, as well as establishing a permanent presence in space. Luan Enjie, director of 
Chinese counterpart to NASA, the China National Space Administration (CNSA), said, 
“Exploring the Moon is the first stepped in exploring deep space”.112 But it is important 
to note that China is not on a “Moon or bust” trajectory and is moving at a measured pace 
towards fulfillment of its lofty space ambitions. Hu Shixiang, deputy in charge of China’s 
manned space flight program, said “I think about 10 to 15 years later, we will have the 
ability to build our own space station and carry out a manned Moon landing”.113 Hu also 
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added that, “China is developing its space program at its own pace, not competing with 
the U.S. It’s not the competition of the Cold War era”.114  
        On October 24, 2007, the Chinese launched the Chang’E-1 lunar probe, which was 
designed to map the Moon’s surface and serve as the first of three stages for follow on 
lunar missions.115 After orbiting the Moon for over a year, its “charged-coupled device 
(CCD) camera was able to create a high-resolution map of the Moon, to include the dark 
side of the Moon”.116 A second probe, the Chang’E-2, is an un-manned lunar probe 
scheduled for launch sometime before the end of 2011, and will “conduct experiments 
involving five core technologies such as orbital adjustments and soft landings”.117 As part 
of this second stage of lunar research, it will be followed by another probe, Chang’E-3, 
which will also be used to test “soft landings and inspection of the lunar surface”.118 
     The final stage of lunar exploration will involve a “Moon landing and launch of a 
Moon rover [which] will land on the Moon and return to Earth with lunar soil and stone 
samples for scientific research in about 2017.”119 
       Follow-on analysis of Chang’E-1-derived data will be carried out by unusual 
partnership between Macao’s University of Science and Technology (MUST) and the 
National Astronomical Observatories, Chinese Academy of Sciences (NAOC).120 This 
joint lab will be involved in “data analysis, develop relevant software,” and “also launch 
another two projects concerning the water detection [sic] on the Moon surface and data 
processing”.121 So, not only is Hong Kong working directly with Beijing on space 
projects, but now Macao has joined the Chinese “space team” and can start garnering 
prestige from the lunar exploration program. With Macao’s and Hong Kong’s joint 
participation in China’s space program, here is another clear example of China using 
space for soft power and political (nationalistic) purposes. 
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Aiming for Mars 
 
 
                         
Figure 5: Mars Missions: (L) Phobos-Grunt and (R) Yinghuo-l122 
 
        Since Chinese ambitions for a Mars project have only recently surfaced, there is not 
a lot of information on the topic. What is notable about the Martian mission is that it will 
be a joint Sino-Russian endeavor that had been scheduled for late 2009, and now is 
delayed because of Russia's decision to postpone the launch of its mission Martian moon 
Phobos in 2011. The Chinese payload is called the Yinghuo-1 (“Yinghuo” means light 
from the firefly in Chinese.), which will ride piggyback on a Russian designed module 
called Phobos-Grunt (“Phobos-Soil”).123 The Russian portion is actually going to the 
Martian satellite Phobos to take a soil sample and then return to Earth, but will drop the 
Yinghuo payload into a Mars orbit.124 Figure 5, above, from the Planetary Society’s 
website, shows early design models for both of these payloads. 
Figure 6, below, shows a composite payload. 
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Figure 6: Artist Illustration of Sino-Russian Mars Probe125  
          The two-year delay will affect the orbiter's scientific tasks, and the delay will also 
increase costs to China, according to Pang Zhihao, a researcher and the deputy editor-in-
chief of the monthly Space International. The incident has shown the disadvantages of 
space international cooperation, according to Ye Peijian, chief designer of the nation's 
first moon probe said that China would be capable of exploring Mars by 2013 if a 
proposed space program received the government support. Ye, said that the most suitable 
time to launch the Mars probe would be in the years 2011, 2013 and 2016 when the 
distances between Mars and the Earth are the shortest.126 Two large satellite ground-
tracking control stations are now under construction for the second stage of China's lunar 
program, which can enable scientists to track and control a Mars probe. As long as China 
develops a more powerful rocket, calculations show China can send a Mars probe into 
orbit on its own, he said. But, since China lacks experience in exploring as far as Mars 
and since such a mission usually has huge costs, international cooperation is a good way 
to carry out China's first Mars probe mission, Pang Zhihao said.127 Once successfully 
placed in a Martian orbit, Yinghuo-1 photographs and data will allow “Chinese space 
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researchers to…study the magnetic field of Mars and the interaction between 
ionospheres, escape particles, and solar wind”.128  
       A “Heavenly Palace”: The Chinese Spacelab 
       
 
Figure 7: An illustration of a proposed Chinese space station planned for by 2020 (credit: 
Chinese Society of Astronautics)129 
       Now that the Chinese have demonstrated a successful spacewalk, or “extra vehicular 
activity” (EVA), on the Shenzhou-7 mission, it seems like putting up a space station is the 
next logical step. Shortly after the Shenzhou-7 capsule returned to Earth, Wang Zhaoyao, 
a spokesman for the Chinese manned program, said, “The ability to maneuver and work 
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outside a spacecraft is essential to China’s goal of putting an astronaut on the Moon and 
having a permanent outpost in space”.130 
        The China National Space Administration has announced plans to launch the first 
module of a space station in 2011. The station, named Tiangong “Heavenly Place”, will 
consist of several modules, the first being Tiangong-1. The first module, weighing 8.5 
tons and launched aboard a modified China’s Long March 2F rocket, will be unmanned. 
Over the next two years, three additional modules on Shenzhou spacecraft, each with two 
or three taikonauts, will dock with Tiangong-1. The final configuration will be smaller 
than the Soviet station, Mir.  
      Tiangong-1 is able to perform long-term unattended operation, which will be an 
essential step toward building a space station. When transformed into a manned space lab, 
Tiangong would provide a "safe room" for Chinese taikonauts to live in and conduct 
research in zero gravity.131 
        Space Laboratory, after accomplishing rendezvous and docking test, space 
laboratory and cargo spaceship will be launched around 2015. More science experiments 
will be carried out with the participation of taikonauts. By operating the space laboratory, 
China will accumulate experiences in building, managing and operating the future space 
station.132 
       Manned Space Station will be around 2020; China will launch and assemble a space 
station with the combination of 20-ton modules. By that time, China will master the 
technology of building and operating LEO space station. The taikonauts will stay in space 
for a long duration and carry out large scale space application and technological 
experiments. The lifetime of the space station is 10 years.133 
      Tiangong-1 was scheduled to launch by the end of 2010, but was delayed for 
technical reasons. It represents the culmination of a larger project, Project 921, started by 
the Chinese space program in 1992. Completion of the space station will be the third and 
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final phase of Project 921, and China says it will be the beginning of international 
cooperation.  
        The Xinhua News report also discusses China's plans for a rocket-production base in 
the northern municipality of Tianjin: 
With a total investment of 10 billion yuan and covering an area of more than one million 
square meters, the base would be capable of producing 12 carrier rockets each year once 
completed, [Liang Xiaohong, a member of the National Committee of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and Party chief of the China 
Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology] said. 
       The base will be able to produce two carrier rockets each year after the first stage of 
construction is completed next year. Liang said experts are currently developing China's 
new generation of carrier rockets, the Long March V, in the Tianjin base, adding that 
research on the initial model of the large-thrust rocket is already underway. Earlier report 
said Long March V, with a maximum payload capacity of up to 25 tonnes, would be put 
into service in 2014. 
"The Long March V should satisfy China's need in its space technology development and 
the peaceful use of space resources in the coming 30 to 50 years, and would meet both 
domestic and overseas market demands for satellite launches before 2030," Liang said.134          
          Most recently, China has selected its second batch of taikonauts, including five 
men and two women, the first time women have joined the country's space mission. This 
is the first time for the Chinese to select and train women taikonauts. The two women 
taikonauts, both aero-transport pilots from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force, 
might take part in manned docking of China's future space lab, said Zhang Jianqi, former 
deputy commander of the country's manned space program.135 
      Although this appears to be from an authoritative source, it would be unwise to take 
this as serious as a government directive issued from the Politburo Standing Committee. 
Nevertheless, it does reflect China’s growing ambition and strong desire to have a 
permanent place in space. 
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III. 3. DOMESTIC SPACE APPLICATIONS & SPINOFFS 
          Given the resource constraints on its budget and personnel, China needed to find 
the proverbial “biggest bang for the yuan” for space technology investment. It smartly 
chose communication satellites to start with, which could support a wide range of 
government services as well numerous civilian and commercial applications. Yardley 
writes, “Satellites have become status symbols and technological necessities for many 
countries that want an ownership stake in the digital world dominated by the West.”136 
Earth-imaging (or “remote sensing”) and weather satellites, which can also support a 
variety of applications are of almost equal importance. Growth in these areas, as well as 
other space-related industries, have had positive side-effects for the Chinese economy, 
commercial growth, and laid a solid foundation for space science and high-technological 
research and development. 
          In the mid-1990s, China was losing its own market for telecommunications. Zhu 
Yilin, then-Secretary-General of the Science and Technology Commission from the 
Chinese Academy of Space Technology, commented, “…about 80% of the domestic 
communication transponder market is occupied by foreign satellites. There is indeed a 
danger of losing whole domestic markets if China cannot build and launch its satellites 
better, faster, and cheaper”.137 Looking at the present state of domestic Chinese space 
capabilities, it seems that the telecommunications satellite and carrier rocket industries 
have responded well. Not only is China basically self-sufficient to meet the needs of its 
domestic customer base, but it also has exported its satellites to other nations.138  
          China also intends on developing its own version of the U.S. Global Positioning 
System (GPS), called Beidou (“Big Dipper”). Zhang Xiaojin, CAST director of 
astronautics, commented that “the [Beidou] system will shake off the dependence on 
foreign systems”.139 While the implied “dependence” likely refers to GPS, it may also be 
viewed as freeing China from having to buy into either the European Galileo program or 
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the Russian GLONASS GPS variants. Currently, there are only five Beidou satellites 
providing regional PNT services, but 10 more will be launched over the next two years 
with a total of 30 additional satellites to be in orbit by 2015, providing full coverage for 
China.140     
        In addition to space-based navigation, remote sensing has also seen a recent growth 
spurt in applications and an ever-growing list of countries that want access to space-
derived geological data. In the Chinese case, this is particularly acute. Since China has “a 
relatively small proportion of arable land to feed its one billion populations, assessing the 
health of the small fields that dominate Chinese agriculture is critical to the country’s 
economic development”.141 China already had limited access to U.S. LANDSAT data, but 
with the launch of its own recoverable remote sensing satellites in the mid-1980s, it was 
able to exploit its own imagery and “no longer rely on the United States for satellite 
imagery of arable land within China’s borders”.142 The results were remarkable with 
some illustrative examples as follows:  
         •       Saved scarce financial resources by producing a geological study on 55,000  
                  square kilometer area of Beijing, Tianjin, and Tangshan, which allowed for    
                  analysis of cultivated land, residential areas, and soil erosion at 1/13 to 1/3 the  
                  cost of typical processes; 
        •        Opened new areas for natural resource extraction by space-based mineral and  
                  geological prospecting analysis, to include discovery of oil in Tarim Basin,  
                  division of the Datong coal fields and discovery of seven new ones in Beijing     
                  suburbs, as well as the discovery of chromite and iron ores in Inner Mongolia; 
         •       Revised maps of major river deltas, which enabled analysis of mud-sand flow  
                  in the Yellow, Luanhe, and Haihe rivers and aided port and river course  
                  construction; and 
         •       Uncovered heretofore unknown historical artifacts with discovery of an  
                  Ancient boundary moat from Jin Dynasty (265 – 420 A.D.) and ruins of  
                  ancient city of Yingchang from Yuan Dynasty (1271 – 1368 A.D.) in Inner     
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                         Mongolia.143      
      Chinese Fengyun weather satellites were also crucial in the run-up to the Beijing 
Olympics. According to the Chinese Meteorological Administration, Fengyun-derived 
data “provided detailed mapping of the algae outbreak at the sailing competition site in 
Qingdao”.144 Armed with accurate data, Chinese authorities proactively managed to clear 
the algae from the sailing regatta course and avoid a loss of face. 
       Space-borne experimentation with seeds is also bearing much fruit. Over the course 
of seven years during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Chinese sent “more than 300 
varieties of seeds of 51 kinds of plants” on recoverable satellites.145 Once back on Earth, 
these seeds were out through a series of breeding tests that “can produce a favorable 
genetic variation that might greatly increase the outputs”.146 These purported “giant 
pumpkins, tomatoes, cucumbers” grown from space-bred seeds had “281.5 percent higher 
[vitamin content] than that of ordinary vegetables.”147 One may see these agricultural 
applications, which have not yet reached a mature stage to date, through a skeptical lens 
and dismiss them as nothing more than wildly exaggerated and unverifiable claims. 
Nevertheless, even the small and remote potential promise of strains of “super seeds” 
would have a major political impact in trying to appear to be addressing the continual 
problem of feeding the world’s most populous nation. 
       In order to consolidate and achieve greater output of civil applications of space 
related technologies, China has started to construct two main aerospace industrial bases. 
The first one is the Shanghai Aerospace Science and Technology Industrial Base, and 
will support a space science park, an aerospace museum, and an aerospace research and 
development center.148 It will “jointly promote the growth of civil aerospace business, 
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technological innovation and the application of such technologies”.149 The second one is 
going to be built in Xi’an, which is already home to China’s Satellite Control Center and 
“more than 200 aerospace research centers and enterprises in the city”,150 to include 
China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) and its associated research institutes. The 
Xi’an center will “focus on developing satellites, new materials, energies, IT and other 
technologies for the benefit of civil application”.151 With hopes of attracting future space-
related businesses and research facilities to plant roots there, Zhao Hongzhuan, currently 
the director overseeing the Xi’an base construction, said, “We will build it into a world 
class aerospace base”.152 
        This “build it [aerospace base] and they will come” approach is also being supported 
by a slightly different, “capitalist” tactic. During the 11th Convention of Overseas 
Chinese Scholars held in Guangzhou last December, there was an announcement that a 
“financial incentive of up to 5 million yuan (US$731,000), among other things, will be 
offered to overseas Chinese entrepreneurs and professionals who settle in Guangzhou and 
open new [space-related] businesses”.153 What is unclear is whether this was devised at 
the Guangzhou provincial-level to attract high-tech firms to the area, or a more strategic 
decision made back in Beijing. 
         In addition to the creation of civilian-focused space research centers, China is also 
reaching out to the civilian space scientific community for future missions in space. 
Although the first taikonauts were PLA Air Force pilots, it seems China realizes the need 
for putting civilians in space, and may mark the beginning of a departure from what has 
historically been a military-led effort. Zhang Jianqi, deputy chief commander of China’s 
manned space program, said “China’s manned space project will start setting up space 
laboratories and stations after 2012, and by that time [civilian] scientists will be needed 
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for a large number of experiments in space”.154 Zhang also extended the invitation to 
scientists from both Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions, since the 
Shenzhou-8 “still had the space for more experiments”.155 Thus, Beijing is trying to 
recruit from all parts of China, especially those with high-technology connections. 
         In December, 2008, only a few months after the successful Shenzhou-7 mission, 
Zhang Jianqi headed a small delegation of several taikonauts to Hong Kong. During an 
open session with reporters, he announced that “…one day, by which I mean some day in 
the near future, Hong Kong will have its [own] astronaut in space on our [Chinese] 
spacecraft.”156 He also noted that there has already been cooperation between Beijing and 
Hong Kong on several space projects, and even alluded to having China’s “first women 
astronaut in the future phases of strategy that are expected to involve more laboratory 
works [sic]”.157 Betty Fung, director of information services in Hong Kong, commented 
that “People in Hong Kong are proud of the success [of the Chinese space program]”.158 
The trip seemed to serve both as a propaganda effort promoting China’s recent success in 
space as well as a recruiting campaign aimed at younger scientists and engineers 
currently studying at Hong Kong’s prestigious universities. 
       In order to support future Shenzhou, Tiangong and future lunar-related missions, 
China needs to develop a new heavy-launch booster. On March, 2008, the Chinese 
Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) announced that it “finished most of the 
designing work for the country’s Long March-5 large thrust carrier rocket and will soon 
present an initial model”.159 CALT Vice President Liang Xiaohong said that the Long 
March-5 will have a “maximum payload capacity up to 25 tons…is expected to be able to 
send lunar rovers, large satellites and space stations into space after 2014”.160 What the 
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article also noted was that this new heavy-lift rocket was not just for domestic satellites 
and supporting CNSA’s lunar and deep space programs, but that it will position China to 
“compete for launching commercial satellites on the international market”.161 Thus, 
China will be able to offer complete “cradle to grave” space services packages for the 
now-in-demand large GEO communications satellites, from design, manufacture, launch, 
and follow-on TT&C ground segment services. 
 
 
Figure 8: Map of Hainan Island and Wenchang Satellite Launch Facility162 
            Liang Xiaohong confirmed that, “The Long March-5 rockets will be made in 
Tianjin and launched in Hainan”.163 Since Tianjin is a port city close to Beijing, it will be 
easy to transport the mammoth 5-meter fairing of the new carrier rockets via cargo ship 
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down to Hainan Island and avoid the narrow network of railways and tunnels that 
sometimes constrain rocket and payload size. The new Wenchang space launch facility’s, 
which will replace Xichang, between 2014 and 2015, not in 2013 as it was previously 
announced, and will give China its southernmost launch facility. Being only 19 degrees 
off the equator has the added benefit of the Earth’s rotation, or “Earth assist,” which 
means it can convert that extra kinetic “push” into greater payload mass (satellite bus size 
or extra fuel). Given the launch facility’s far eastern location and the prevailing trend to 
launch prograde (eastward), there will be minimal risk to the neighboring communities 
about fallout or other launch-related hazards.  
          Wenchang will boast China’s newest rocket command center, rocket-launch pad, 
rocket assembly plant, and China’s first-ever visitor center.164 The actual rocket 
launching site will be in Longlou Town, with the launch tower “800 meters (just under 
half a mile) away from the seaside”.165 One nice spin-off from the Wenchang launch 
center will be the construction of “China’s sole space-science theme park, at a cost of 
seven billion yuan (approx. $1,023,593,570 USD)”.166 Although the article did not go 
into detail as to what the space park would consist of, such a large plan that is almost 
triple the expenditure allotted for the Shanghai aerospace industrial base (Wenchang will 
receive seven billion yuan compared to only 2.2 billion for Shanghai) will have a major 
impact in the local economy and may attract both domestic and international aerospace 
businesses to the southern Chinese island. 
         China’s space program has brought immense benefits to its industrial, commercial, 
and agricultural programs. Johnson-Freese notes, “Having studied the Apollo playbook, 
China understands there are multiple rewards to be reaped from a successful manned 
space program. China sees a space program as generating technology and technology as 
spurring economic development”.167 As the demand on “telecommunications industry and 
demand for remote sensing services continue to grow,” China will see an “increase [in] 
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future financial revenues, as well as the quality and number of available jobs produced in 
China”.168 
         The manned space program alone has brought significant benefits, to include “new 
capabilities in computers, aerospace materials, fabrication technologies, electronics and 
integration and test as well as experience in developing major subsystems such as 
guidance, attitude control, propulsion and life support”.169 One recent article boasts that 
“nearly 80 percent of new materials developed by Chinese scientists were first used in 
space…and almost 2,000 space-related inventions have been used in other sectors”.170 
One example of this was the “Outer Space Cup” or “Dislin Cup” that the first Chinese 
taikonaut, Yang Liwei, drank tea from during his journey in outer space.171 As the cup 
was “designed to withstand extreme temperatures and the rugged environment of space” 
as well as being “leakproof which alleviates problems in microgravity,” the special cup 
was an immediate hit after Yang landed back on Earth and is still being marketed 
today.172 
          In addition to the technical side of space-derived products, there have been a 
number of cultural spin-offs from the space program as well. Prior to the spacewalk of 
Shenzhou-7, there were nationwide contests for “schoolchildren to create artwork to 
commemorate the feat”.173 Clearly, the Chinese government aimed to plant seeds in the 
young minds that will hopefully grow up to be pioneering CNSA space scientists! On a 
slightly more offbeat angle, there was also a “black-market cell phone handset 
maker…doing brisk business selling a rocket-shaped mobile device painted red with 
‘Shenzhou VII’ stamped on the side”.174 
         Beyond economic impact, China’s manned space program has created more general 
domestic interest in space sciences. According to Yan Feng, chief editor of the Chinese 
edition of Science & Vie, a popular European science magazine, the Shenzhou program 
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has helped astronomy become “the top interest of science readers the past two years”.175 
Most of the manned space launches have been by ardently watched live by junior 
astronomic buffs that make the long trek to the launch site in Hebei province to see each 
launch with their own eyes.176 China’s spacewalk in 2008 left an especially deep 
impression on China’s massive population. The event, estimated by AGB Nielsen Media 
Research to have been watched by more than half of available Chinese households, 
compelled Shanghai-based computer technician Qu Yin to say, “I really wanted to cry 
when I saw the national flag Zhai [Zhigang] wave in space and the red characters ‘Fei 
Tian’ on the [sic] homemade [Chinese-made] spacesuit he wore”.177 Li Lunchang, who 
currently lives in Qiqihar, Heilongjiang Province, beamed, “I feel very proud of the three 
taikonauts on board the craft [Shenzhou-7], especially because two of them [Zhai 
Zhigang and Liu Boming] came from Qiqihar”.178 
       Success of the Shenzhou-7 space walk also spurred Chinese youth to launch their 
own rockets to commemorate the flight. A group of students from the Harbin Institute of 
Technology launched 16 “self-made micro-rockets” from a Shenzhou-7 capsule-shaped 
launch pad. He Mingjie, one of the participants, said, “The success of the Shenzhou-7 
mission has made us even more enthusiastic about the space programs [sic]. I hope 
someday I can join the program, too”.179 
        China’s burgeoning online community, now the largest in the world, also avidly 
watch space launches and use weblogs to show their enthusiasm and support.180 Online 
forums were “packed with warm remarks left by Chinese netizens, many of whom 
watched the landing of the Shenzhou-7 vessel through live video broadcast at major 
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portals”.181 One patriotic netizen wrote, “Even though China’s space technology is still 
not as strong as the United States and Russia [sic], our future is bright. Just look at how 
many young people are interested in the [sic] space technology”.182 
       So, China’s space program has far-reaching impacts across the nation. From helping 
the Chinese Communist Party garner prestige and legitimacy, serving as a beacon for 
attracting and inspiring the next generation of space scientists and engineers, to having 
numerous positive civilian applications, the space program indeed is living up to its role 
as “an integral part of the state’s comprehensive development strategy”.183 Speaking at 
Harvard’s Fairbank Center China Current Events Workshop in November 2005, Johnson- 
Freese noted:  
 
The Chinese government… [is] banking on the effort generating a burst of 
economic development from spin-off technologies. The program itself is 
an employment program as well as a space program, providing work and 
training for thousands in the Chinese technology sector.184 
 
        Indeed, China has been successfully marketing its space program for domestic 
consumption and is reaping its rewards. China, however, also realizes that a successful 
space program can also bring potential rewards beyond its borders. Thus, the next chapter 
shifts focus to the international dimension of the Chinese space program and how China 
is maximizing its rising clout in space to have a global impact as it interacts with other 
nations. 
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CHAPTER IV: CHINA’S “SOFT POWER” IN SPACE: INTERNATIONAL 
ASPECTS 
 
        China’s space program got its initial start with Russian assistance back in the 
1950s, but has come a long way since then, becoming a global exporter of space 
technologies and applications. Since announcing that it would be “entering the 
[international] commercial satellite launch market at the UNISPACE Conference in 
Geneva in August 1982,”185 its growing space-related research, development, and 
industrial bases have allowed it to build “sophisticated launchers and 
satellites…conservatively aiming to capture 15 percent of the global market for such 
services”.186 Looking out from its ambitious 1982 mandate, this chapter will analyze who 
China has been working with in space internationally, in what capacities, and how it 
applies space-focused soft power to maintain and exploit its international relations 
agenda. It will also examine how other countries, especially in Asia, view its rapid rise as 
a space power. Finally, it concludes by assessing three different U.S. perspectives on the 
rise of Chinese space activities. 
         Since there are only two official Chinese government documents concerning its 
own space program that also contain language concerning its role in the international 
arena, it makes sense to use these key documents as a starting point. Specifically, the 
2000 version spells out some of the key guiding concepts and principles and sheds light 
on Chinese intent to: 
          •       Emphasize international exchanges and cooperation in the area of space  
                   [technology] (zhongshi hangtianlingyu de guoji jiaoliu yu hezuo); 
          •       Renovate [space science and technology] institutions and technology and  
                   establish an operational mechanism geared toward both domestic and  
                   international markets; 
          •       Increase simultaneously the capability of space development of all countries,  
                   especially the developing countries, and enable all countries to enjoy the  
                   benefits of space technology; 
           •       Emphasize Asia-Pacific regional space cooperation; and 
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           •       Support Chinese space enterprises to participate in international space  
                    commercial launch services in line with the principles of equality, equity and     
                     reciprocity.187 
          Although the 2006 White Paper does not deviate from these points, it does 
highlight more of the cooperative projects in the intervening years (2000-05) with other 
countries. It also boasts that China has:  
         •       Signed cooperation agreements on the peaceful use of outer space and space  
                 project cooperation agreements with Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France,      
                 Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, ESA, and the European Union  
                 Committee; 
         •       Signed space cooperation memorandums with space organizations of India,     
                  and Great Britain; and 
         •       Conducted exchanges with space-related bodies of Algeria, Chile, Germany,     
                  Italy, Japan, Peru, and the United States.188 
        What is more curious is that China’s recently published “White Paper on National 
Defense” contained the following language: “Major breakthroughs have been made in 
developing the international market for space products. China has exported its first 
satellite, and the Earth resources satellite project with Brazil [CBERS] has played an 
important role in both countries’ economic development”.189 It seems slightly out of 
place for a primarily defense-focused white paper to contain any reference to a joint 
space project. While hawkish-minded China watchers may see this as confirmation as to 
the true military intent driving the space program, I see it more as a poke in eye for 
America as well as a point to brag about. The sentence right before it is, “China’s 
defense-related science, technology, and industry actively conduct cooperation with other 
countries in the field of hi-tech industries, combining military and civilian needs, and 
                                                 
187
 White Paper, “China’s Space Activities,” (2000). Original white paper (Chinese “baipishu”) in 
Chinese at: http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615708/n620168/n750545/index.html (accessed in April 4, 2010). 
Italics emphasis mine. Pinyin in parentheses hereafter for terms as I compared the original Chinese text to 
the English translation. 
188
 White Paper, “China’s Space Activities” (2006). See also, “China Signs 16 Int’l Space Cooperation 
Agreements, Memorandums in Five Years.” People’s Daily (Online), October 12, 2006. 
189
 White Paper. China’s National Defense in 2008. People’s Republic of China, Information Office 
of the State Council, January, 2009, 33. See section under “Enhancing Cooperation with Other Countries.” 
63 
 
makes great efforts to develop hi-tech civilian products with high added value,”190 thus it 
seems like China is merely highlighting one of its showcase cooperative ventures with 
another country, which happens to be space-related. Kevin Pollpeter echoes this idea 
behind the 2006 White Paper as he notes that, “…the document serves as a venue to tout 
China’s accomplishments in space not only for domestic political and bureaucratic 
reasons, but also to advertise China’s viability as an international partner in space”.191 He 
also noted China’s space program will help it “achieve great power status within a system 
dominated by the United States and to increase its international influence without 
triggering a counterbalancing reaction”.192 
         Clearly, for a nation to successfully achieve manned spaceflight is a tremendous 
accomplishment with significant second-order impacts. Dean Cheng, CNA China space 
expert, notes, “At the very least it seems the manned programme is about international 
prestige. China’s space capability says to the world, ‘We are an advanced nation’”.193 
Cheng also asserts that “Another driver is diplomacy. A wide-ranging space programme 
showed the rest of the world that China had arrived on the international stage. That fits 
with hosting the Olympics, that fits with a burgeoning economy, and that fits with the 
world’s largest foreign capital reserves”.194 William Burrows offers the label of 
“international power,” and that for China to develop such a complex, multi-faceted 
program with ambitions for a space station and the Moon “requires a huge, advanced 
scientific and technological base that suggests a stable and powerful political system; 
what used to be called national ‘might’”.195 
         Below is a region-by-region breakdown of Chinese international cooperation and 
joint ventures in space. 
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IV. 1. CHINA WITH EUROPE 
          China has had a long history of space project interaction and cooperation with 
European countries. Its first satellite, the Dongfanghong-1 (“East is Red,” 
communications satellite) was built largely with German-engineered high-technology 
subsystems, to include power-generation and attitude control, along with French 
assistance.196 Vincent Sabathier, a former Space Attaché at the French Embassy, sees a 
growing trend of space cooperation between the European Space Agency (ESA) and 
China, especially since “European manufacturers have now invested in ITAR-free 
technology that allows them to export systems with the previous tedious, and some say 
prohibitive, ITAR rules.”197 
          In July 2001, the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA, similar to 
NASA) partnered with ESA to collaborate on a joint mission to study the Earth’s 
magnetic environment, China’s first cooperative international project with another space 
agency. ESA provided a four-satellite Cluster mission while the Chinese provided two 
small Double Star satellites.198 One of the Double Star satellites circles the poles while 
the other remains in equatorial orbit to collect data. As an incentive for Chinese 
cooperation and data sharing, ESA has “handed over 10 spare Cluster instruments worth 
$ 6.8 million.”199 
          In 2004, ESA joined with the National Remote Sensing Center of China (NRSCC, 
under the PRC Ministry of Science and Technology, or “MOST”) and started the 
ESAMOST Dragon program, which is a “three-year science and exploitation…in the 
field of Earth observation application development”.200 This program was so successful 
that it has been expanded for another four years under the “Dragon 2” title and now 
includes “25 projects exploiting ESA, TPM, and Chinese EO [electro-optical] data for 
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land, ocean, and atmospheric science and application development”.201 Also in 2004, the 
EU surpassed Japan as China’s largest trading partner with Sino-EU trade accounting for 
over $160 billion.202 Although the economic ties are very strong, China’s grander strategy 
with Europe is based on “science and technology diplomacy” (keiji waijiao) over normal 
“economic diplomacy” (jingji waijiao), since much of the technical space know how that 
China lacks can be found in Europe and is free from U.S. export restrictions.203 
It seemed to be in that spirit that China recently purchased a satellite made by the French 
firm, Alcatel, which was proudly announced to be “ITAR-free” and impervious to U.S. 
badgering.204 
          Beyond mere satellite purchases, China recently scored what some space industry 
analysts are calling a “commercial coup” with its recent agreement to launch a five-ton 
French satellite for Eutelsat Communications. Since the satellite has no U.S.-made 
components, it is not bound by U.S. policy restrictions and will mark the first Chinese 
launch of a Western satellite in more than a decade. Although the launch will not take 
place until late 2010, it “could prompt owners of other large commercial satellite fleets to 
enter similar arrangements with Chinese launch providers.”205 Citing China’s 
comparative advantage in lift services and strong launch record, which is usually “40% 
less than the $100 million [price tag] for the most expensive launches on European 
rockets,” there is a chance to lure other potential customers away from considering more 
expensive and, perhaps more politically complicated, U.S. launch options.206 
        Shortly after this deal was announced, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (R-
California) launched a lowbrow attack on China. He referred to China as a proliferator of 
weapons of mass destruction and stated, “Ten years ago, the Cox Report clearly 
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demonstrated that U.S. technology transfers to the PRC helped to improve and enhance 
the efficiency of China’s arsenal of missiles that were aimed at us”.207 He also added that 
despite needed changes to ITAR, America should ensure “that these scofflaw and rogue 
nations are barred from receiving our high tech systems,”208 and called for sanctions on 
Eutelsat. While one can expect some measure of high-level political response in order to 
show patriotic support for the U.S. aerospace industry, his comments may end up driving 
more business away from America.209 Only time will tell to see if either France-based 
Eutelsat, or the French-Italian space consortium of Thales Alenia Space, which currently 
has several contracts for Pentagon satellites and military communications, will end up 
being “punished” by Congress for “promoting Chinese space interests”.210 
       Chinese space relations with Europe, despite potential political fallout with the 
United States, seem to be moving along at an excellent pace well into the next decade. 
With the expansion of the successful Dragon program with ESA, purchases of French-
built satellites, and the upcoming launch of the Sino-German jointly-developed Solar 
Space telescope and French Eutelsat satellites, China has established a significant 
foothold on the European continent for some time to come.211 
 
IV. 2. CHINA WITH SOUTH AMERICA 
           After China was hit with sanctions following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, 
it had to look for non-Western partners to help its then-nascent aerospace industry. Its 
search led to it to South America, starting with Brazil’s National Institute of Space 
Investigations (INEP). 
           Brazil started researching space in the 1960s and launched its first satellite, the 
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SCD-1 Data Collection Satellite, on February 9, 1993.212 When the United States decided 
to switch the management of LANDSAT data from NASA and NOAA over to the Earth 
Observation Satellite Company (EOSAT, a joint venture of Hughes and RCA) and 
financial problems that affected data availability started to emerge, Brazil, among other 
nations, started to look elsewhere for reliable remote sensing data.213 With a focus on 
joint development rather than trying to go it alone, they joined forces with the Chinese 
and started work on the Chinese-Brazilian Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS, also called 
“Ziyuan” by the Chinese) in July, 1988, after President José Sarney visited China.214This 
marked China’s “first international cooperative space technology venture with another 
developing country,” and eventually led to the successful launch of two satellites, Ziyuan-
1 in October 1999, and Ziyuan-2 in September 2000.215 The CBERS project was an effort 
to: 
Use advanced space remote sensing techniques to inventory, develop, 
manage, and monitor the Chinese and Brazilian Earth resources in 
agriculture, forestry, geology, hydrology, geography, cartography, 
meteorology, and environment, etc. [as well as] promotion [sic] of the 
development and application of space remote sensing and space 
technology in China and Brazil.216 
    
         Brazil saw additional benefits from this new relationship with China. First, the 
CBERS program offered a cheaper alternative to its original plan to build four satellites 
under the Brazilian Complete Mission (MECB). Given budgetary constraints, teaming on 
a joint project could help stretch scarce space program dollars out even further. China 
also benefited for this reason as well, especially since its own indigenous capability and 
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its “services and operations in the field of meteorology, navigation, and remote sensing 
were essentially dependent on foreign satellites”.217 For part of this program, China 
turned to England for assistance. Audrey Nice, a spokesperson for the University of 
Surrey, stated that “[CBERS] was built under a know-how transfer and training program 
between the UK and China”.218 The CBERS project also involved “ten Chinese engineers 
and scientists spending a full year at the Surrey Space Centre in England, working with 
British engineers on the design, construction, and test of the payload. British experts also 
installed a Space Mission Control ground station at Qinghua University in Beijing”.219 
Currently, the CBERS program has successfully launched three satellites, with an 
agreement to launch two more through 2013. It is considered part of the world’s main 
Earth-observation satellite constellations, comparable to the “U.S. LANDSAT, French 
SPOT, and the Indian ResourceSat”.220 
        Recently, China has pursued greater relations with Venezuela centered on oil 
imports and national defense issues. Venezuela stands out as the “most prominent 
example” of the “leftist, anti-American governments” in the region.221 Venezuelan 
President Chavez notes his country has “100 satellite technicians training in 
China…radars, tracking stations, and air defenses are being installed right now”.222 The 
satellite, officially called the VENESAT-1, but also named the “Simon Bolivar” after the 
South American revolutionary hero, will be used for “government and military 
communications and to give remote parts of the country access to telephones and the 
Internet.”223 The VENESAT-1 marks China’s “first contract for satellite manufacturing 
and launch service for a Latin American country”.224 Nuris Orihuela, Venezuelan Vice 
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Minister of Science and Technology, confirmed that there will actually be 90 technicians 
who will be working on the satellite, to include “30 [specialists] who will carry out 
special studies in China”.225 
         Although VENESAT-1 was successfully launched from China’s Xichang Satellite 
Launch Center on October 30, 2008 (watched by millions of Venezuelans), it had to first 
undergo several months of testing before being declared fully operational. Finally, on 
January 24, 2009, in a ceremony “held in one of the satellite’s mainland stations in the 
town of El Combrero, it was officially handed off to Venezuelan satellite control 
operators,” enabling Venezuela to become only the fourth nation in Latin America with 
any capability in satellite communications.226 
        Now that the satellite is operational, President Chavez’s $406 million-dollar 
investment seems to be stirring up considerable enthusiasm for future space-based 
applications, to include: 
         •       Expanding the reach of the Caracas-based Telesur television network; 
         •       Bringing telecommunications to remote and rugged areas of southeastern 
                 Venezuela where standard landlines are expensive and difficult to operate; and 
         •       Bringing “tele-medicine” and “tele-education” to remote areas, especially  
                  the Warao Indians in the Orinoco river basin.227 
         Socorro Hernandez, Minister of Telecommunications and Information, said that 
“during the first year of its operation [VENESAT-1] will focus on domestic needs. This 
includes over 100 towns that have poor or no access to basic telephone services”.228            
Uruguay, although coming late to the project, provided approximately ten percent of the 
overall $241-million project cost.229 It will likely be able to access a proportional number 
of transponders for its domestic communication requirements. More importantly, 
however, it also “traded” its orbit slot at 78 degrees west to gain satellite access, which 
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allows for “north-south coverage from southern Mexico to Chile and Argentina, and east-
west coverage from Brasilia, Brazil, to well past Lima, Peru, in the Pacific Ocean”.230 
        Venezuela recently asked China for assistance to obtain imagery capability after it 
failed to buy its way into the Israeli-led ImageSat program. Though details are currently 
sketchy, it appears that China will launch an Earth-observation satellite for them 
sometime in 2013, giving Venezuela its first-ever organic capability of direct-downlinked 
imagery from space.231 
          More recently, China has pursued relations with Bolivia to create a space agency to 
manage and execute a satellite project of Chinese companies to improve communications 
in the country. In October 2009, the Bolivian government, China's Great Wall Industry 
Corporation and the International Telecommunication Union signed a memorandum to 
construct and set a satellite in orbit. Bolivia is investing some 300 million U.S. dollars in 
this project.232 
        "This program is very important for Bolivia, because with the improvement of the 
communication system, the development of production, education, health, detection of 
natural phenomena, technology and other sectors will be boosted," Delgadillo said.233 
        The satellite, "Tupac Katari," is named in honor of an indigenous leader of 18th-
century Bolivia. It is expected to be in orbit in 2013.  
 
IV. 3. CHINA WITH AFRICA 
          China, in what some analysts have viewed as both a display of soft power as well 
as natural resource diplomacy, negotiated a deal with Nigeria to build, launch, and 
operate a communications satellite. The Japan-based East Asian Strategic Review 2008 
cited this project as an example of “China’s exploitation of space activities as a 
diplomatic tool”.234 Ahmed Rufai, CEO of Nigerian Communication Satellite Ltd., said 
that after Nigeria put the project up for international bidding in April 2004, “21 bids 
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arrived from major aerospace companies, but nearly all of failed to meet a key 
requirement: a significant financial package”.235 China generously loaned Nigeria most of 
the money for the project, likely banking on the fact that Nigeria’s rich oil deposits will 
serve as collateral. With a successful satellite launch on May 14, 2007, there are now 
talks of a possible follow-on satellite to help Nigeria break into the “digital world 
dominated by the West”.236 Xu Jianguo, Chinese ambassador to Nigeria commented that 
this launch will serve to, “[enhance] mutual political trust, and economic and trade 
relations”.237 Rufai hopes to improve Nigeria’s “communication quality, including 
Internet services,” and is “actively working with its Chinese partners to prepare 
NIGCOMSAT-2 and NIGCOMSAT-3”.238 
        China’s space endeavors in Nigeria have endured some criticism, though. Kayode 
Fayemi, who leads the Nigerian policy think tank, the Center for Democracy and 
Development, stated that, “It looks like what could be a white elephant. In the scale of 
preference, this [space program] doesn’t qualify as the most-needed project”.239 A space 
program in a country where there is still much poverty, lack of basic infrastructure (e.g. 
running water, electricity, paved roads) appears to be misdirected government spending. 
But given the upward momentum in space-related activity and talk of future satellites to 
come on board, it seems like the Sino-Nigeria space cooperation will continue for some 
time to come, despite serious domestic political challenges.240 
         One unexpected challenge to this promising relationship occurred last November, 
when the NIGCOMSAT-1 had a malfunction.241 Nigerian Communications Satellite 
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Limited, which is responsible for satellite TT&C, issued a statement saying, 
“NIGCOMSAT-1 is not missing, but rather powered down. When we observed abnormal 
battery discharge in a non-eclipse situation. The satellite was put into an emergency mode 
operation in order to effect mitigation and repairs”.242 After further analysis was done, it 
was moved into a permanent parking orbit and was determined to be beyond recovery.243 
People are first agitating for a quicker delivery for the follow-on NIGCOMSATs-2 and -3, 
since the satellite was supposed to last for 15 years, and was to provide not only “phone, 
broadband Internet and broadcasting services to rural Africa,” but also was used for 
“intelligence, security surveillance and other sectors such as the oil and gas industry”.244 
        Given the relatively recent timing of this event, it may be premature to assess 
whether this malfunction with ties back to China will have a negative impact on Beijing’s 
future satellite business. The same satellite design was sold, built, and launched for 
Venezuela and was recently handed over in January 2009. Perhaps the successful 
VENESAT-1 project will help allay concerns over the NIGCOMSAT-1 failure and 
minimize any impact to China’s standing in the commercial space arena. 
          Politically, the NIGCOMSAT project still has support thus far despite the failure. 
The Nigerian House of Representative’s Committee on Science and Technology recently 
concluded a two-day public hearing concerning the loss of NIGCOMAT-1. Despite 
having initial doubts about spending money on new space projects, both expert testimony 
and “a clause committing them [China Great Wall Industry Corporation] to replace the 
satellite in the event of failure” seemed to have carried enough weight in order to help 
pass a resolution asking for “more communication satellites…to strengthen Nigeria’s 
participation in space exploration”.245 
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IV. 4. CHINA WITH ASIA 
           One of the current problems facing the Asian region, which was highlighted in a 
recent conference on “Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives on Acceptable 
Approaches,” is the “lack [of] any regional consensus on space security”.246 There have 
been attempts at trying to consolidate some kind of space-focused space forum in Asia, 
starting with the Asia-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and 
Applications (AP-MCSTA). AP-MCSTA was born from a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between China, Pakistan, and Thailand in February, 1992, with the 
hopes of achieving greater cooperation in the region. Per its official website: 
 
[Viewing] the immense potential of space technology and its spin-off 
benefits in the socio-economic uplift of the countries resulting in the 
transformation of quality of life of the society as a whole, and in order to 
pursue and to strengthen the multilateral cooperation among the countries 
of the Asia-Pacific Region in the peaceful applications of Space Science 
and Space Technology [establish AP-MCSTA].247 
 
        At the initial AP-MCSTA workshop in Beijing, China, over “120 government 
officials, decision-makers, experts and scholars…from 16 countries including mainly 
Australia, China, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Thailand and 
other Asia-Pacific countries and international organizations” participated and decided to 
establish a Liaison Committee with China serving as its coordinator.248 The Liaison 
Committee was established in 1994, and a Preparatory Committee for an Asia-Pacific 
Space Cooperation Mechanism and a Secretariat were established in 1999, both in China. 
During that interim five-year period and leading up to 2003, seven more AP-MCSTA 
conferences were held in Thailand, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Bahrain, Iran, China, 
and Thailand, and all participating nations “unanimously recommended to speed up the 
process of institutionalization of the Cooperation Mechanism”.249 Finally on October 28, 
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2005, eight nations signed the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) 
Convention.250 
          China, by leading the initial discussion in 1992 to establish the MoU and then to 
host several more conferences to discuss the AP-MCSTA goals, then to serve as the 
coordinating nation for the AP-MCSTA Liaison Committee and Secretariat, and then 
offer to host the headquarters for APSCO, has firmly established itself as a leader of 
space-related matters in Asia. Its forward-leaning presence and foresight to take the reins 
in the formation, coordination, and sponsorship of an Asian-focused space organization 
will likely translate to an increase in soft power and prestige throughout the region. As 
part of his address to the 59th International Astronautical Congress held in Glasgow in 
October, 2008, Sun Laiyan proudly declared that “China was prepared to lead the 
APSCO”.251 
         Before APSCO fully came online in 2005, Beijing also started a separate project 
titled the “Cooperation in Small Multi-Mission Satellite (SMMS) and Other Related 
Activities” in April, 1998, with Iran, the Republic of (North) Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, 
as well as Thailand.252 The SMMS concept is built around a “three-axis stabilized small 
multi-mission satellite platform [that] will support many kinds of payloads [to include a] 
multi-spectral CCD camera and hyper-spectrum imager that performs Earth observation, 
Ka-band communication experiment equipment, data collection and store and forward 
data transmission (DCS/SAF) and middle ultraviolet backscatter radiometer to do space 
science research”.253 Zhang Nu, one of the lead Chinese engineers working on the SMMS 
project commented, “We want the program to be a model for space cooperation in the 
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Asia-Pacific region”.254 Despite being touted as being used for purely civilian purposes, 
especially in the areas of environmental and disaster monitoring, some people are 
concerned about the growth of space-imaging capability among so many nations, and to 
what extent the SMMS might enhance Iran’s “military reconnaissance capability”.255 
         China has also pushed its space agenda into the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), which by original design is more of an economic forum than one for 
space issues, and does not include China. Using the AP-MCSTA as top cover, China 
organized a “China-ASEAN Training Course on Applications of Satellite Remote-
Sensing and Satellite Communication Technologies in Disaster Reduction” for nine 
ASEAN countries.256 Sponsored by the China-ASEAN Cooperation Fund, the 13-day 
training covered a series of topics: 
         •      Enhance the capacity of ASEAN Member Countries in applying satellite  
                 remote-sensing and satellite communication technologies in disaster reduction; 
         •       Facilitate the role of these technologies in the practice of disaster reduction;  
                  and 
         •        Promote the cooperation between China and ASEAN Member Countries in  
                  disaster reduction using space technology.257 
          Given the apparent success of this project, it is likely that other training courses or 
space-based educational opportunities will arise with China as a leading organizer, 
sponsor, or participant. China’s continual investment in training foreign students in space 
applications and sharing space-derived data has huge soft power potential, such as the 
Thai students who trained on remote sensing applications through China’s “Master 
Program on Space Technology and Applications” and can now take full advantage of 
their own Thailand Earth Observation Satellite (THEOS).258 China is also sharing data 
with Myanmar so it can “better monitor opium cultivation within its borders,” as well as 
weather data, which is “still being used by several Asian countries including Laos, 
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Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand as well as other South and Central Asian 
countries”.259 As fellow APSCO members Thailand and Indonesia have now launched 
their own satellites by other nations, APSCO, “with China as its leader…has a good 
chance of becoming very successful [organization]”.260 
        China solidified its position as an end-to-end satellite service provider when it 
concluded a deal with Pakistan in October 2008 to build and launch a telecommunication 
satellite. During a state visit in Beijing, newly elected Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari 
negotiated a deal with Chinese President Hu Jintao for the Paksat-1R, which will provide 
“domestic telecommunication and broadcast services” for Pakistan sometime in 2011.261 
Thus, Pakistan has now joined Nigeria and Venezuela as countries for which China has 
provided “cradle to grave” space-based telecommunication services. 
 
IV. 5. CHINA WITH THE UNITED NATIONS 
           China’s 2000 White Paper on its space activities proudly declares that China 
“supports strengthening the function of the United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs 
(OOSA) and supports the outer space application programs of the United Nations”.262 It 
also starts out the section on “International Cooperation” with: 
 
The Chinese government holds that international space cooperation should 
follow the fundamental principles listed in the “Deceleration [sic] on 
International Cooperation on Exploring and Utilizing Outer Space for the 
Benefits and Interests of All Countries, Especially in Consideration of 
Developing Countries’ Demands,” which was approved by the 51st 
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1996.263 
 
       The idea that all international space cooperation and activities should follow U.N. 
guidelines is continued in the 2006 version, which states that China “supports activities 
regarding the peaceful use of outer space within the framework of the United Nations”.264 
                                                 
259
 Ibid. 
260
 Kislyakov, “Outside View: Asian Missile Power.” 
261
 Unattributed, “China to Deliver Telecom Satellite to Pakistan.” SpaceDaily.com, October 17, 
2008. 
262
 White Paper, “China’s Space Activities” (2000), under “Section IV. International Cooperation, Guiding 
Principles.” 
263
 Ibid. 
264
 White Paper, “China’s Space Activities” (2006). 
77 
 
On the surface, it seems like there are noble intentions behind their statements. Digging 
deeper, it is more likely that China would like to use the U.N. as a counterweight to U.S. 
space hegemony and ideally, use the U.N. “Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space” 
(PAROS) and Conference on Disarmament (CD) to gently nudge Washington away from 
developing space weapons. Dean Cheng furthers this idea by stating: 
 
Thus, unlike the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), [where] 
China perceived itself as subject to rules it had had no hand in 
formulating. Beijing has sought a seat at the table on space issues, in order 
to help establish the fundamental “rules of the road.” In essence, China is 
intent on being a full participant in determining the international terms and 
conditions for space operations.265 
 
          Since joining the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(U.N. COPUOS) in 1980, as well as participating in the U.N.-sponsored Regional Space 
Application Programme (RESAP), China has maintained a presence in all space-related 
agencies within the U.N. It has supported both the 2000 U.N. General Assembly’s 
resolution for PAROS and the 2003 resolution calling for “negotiations toward 
preventing an arms race in space”.266 With America standing out as the only nation 
voting against both resolutions, China “…has taken advantage of that [opposing] stance 
[by the United States]” and is undercutting U.S. soft power. The U.N. venue not only 
gives China “positive public relations exposure” but also “offers China considerable 
negotiating leverage with a low risk of being held to task for potential follow-through”.267 
Thus, it appears that China is in the mainstream of global opinion while Washington is 
isolated and opposing the majority. 
        During the 1999 CD in Geneva, China tried to further its space agenda by calling for 
“…a special committee for developing a treaty against space weaponization”.268 Over the 
subsequent years, it has followed that by submitting more working papers on “Possible 
Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the 
                                                 
265
 Cheng, “China and the Int’l Space Community: A Brief Overview,” 2. 
266
 Johnson-Freese, “Strategic Communication with China: What Message About Space?”, 47. The 
United States has voted no on both resolutions since 2005. 
267
 Ibid. 
268
 “China’s Space Development—A Tool for Enhancing National Strength and Prestige,” 26. China 
filed the papers alone in 2000, but in 2001 and 2002 was joined by Russia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Belarus, 
Syria, and Zimbabwe. 
78 
 
Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space 
Objects”.269 In addition to offering a similar proposal at the March 2007 meeting of U.N. 
COPUOS by Chinese Ambassador Tang Guoqiang, China joined forces with Russia and 
offered another draft space treaty on February 12, 2008, to the U.N. CD.270 While nothing 
in the language of the draft treaty appeared to be terribly inflammatory towards 
America, the U.S. response to the treaty was a scathing eight-page analysis that called the 
Sino-Russian effort “vague,” a “significant departure” from a previous 2002 working 
paper, and seemed intended only to limit U.S. weapons in space (or the proposed U.S. 
National Missile Defense program), while allowing China or Russia’s ground-based anti-
satellite programs.271 Some analysts feel these efforts were deliberately targeting the 
United States, since China “needs to place a check, even if limited, on the further 
expansion of those capabilities” and that this proposed ban “may just be an expediency 
designed to contain the United States”.272 
        The 2009 CD meeting had been three sessions (January 19-27, May 18–July 3, and 
August 3–September 18), and PAROS is currently on the draft agenda.273 Although 
China has not mentioned PAROS yet in its remarks, it was actually the Egyptian 
representative, Ambassador Hisham Badr, who stated that the U.N. should “establish ad- 
hoc committees as negotiating subsidiary bodies of the Conference for the four core 
issues, namely: Nuclear Disarmament, Negative Security Assurances (NSAs), Prevention 
of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty 
(FMCT)”.274 Only time will tell any future Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in 
Outer Space Treaty (PPWT) will be brought up for discussion this year. 
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IV. 6. CHINA AND POSSIBLE SPACE CHALLENGERS IN ASIA 
           How should countries in Asia respond to the rise of China as a space-faring 
power? Cooperative engagement? Hostility? Waiting cautiously and patiently in the 
background? For nations with poor space capabilities or little space “infrastructure” 
engagement with China seems to be more beneficial than avoidance. With modest 
investment in a data reception site and minimal training on data interpretation, even low-
tech nations can start to receive real-time meteorological data and imagery to assist with 
weather prediction, disaster monitoring, etc. Given the currently flagging world economy, 
it does not make economic sense for each country in Asia to build its own space agency 
from scratch or its own satellites independently, or construct a TT&C ground segment for 
satellite maintenance. Nor could the limited geosynchronous orbital slots accommodate 
multiple satellites for each country. Thus, both for limitations on financial resources and 
because of constraints on physical “room in space,” space cooperation in Asia seems to 
be the better road to pursue. 
         Despite the potential benefits of cooperation, however, there appears to be 
jockeying for a leading role in the direction of space in Asia apart from China. India, 
which has enjoyed recent successes in its Chandrayaan-1 lunar orbiter program, 
continues to research and develop its own space program without Chinese involvement. 
But, in an interview with Press Trust of India, Indian Space Research Organization 
(ISRO) Chairman Madhavan Nair disagreed with any idea of a “space race” between 
China and India, stating:  
 
Our priorities have been in providing the societal services, based on the 
space assets. There, we have been concentrating on Earth observation and 
communication areas. Launch vehicles which are appropriate for these 
missions have been developed. That’s why we have developed 
technologies and systems required for national development.275 
 
       India has also enjoyed benefits from the United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific’s (UNESCAP) establishment of a Center for Space 
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Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP), headquartered at 
the Indian Institute of Remote Sensing in Dehradun, India.276 This gives India a measure 
of regional clout in space, especially since there are 15 signatory nations currently 
participating in the program.277 This is nearly double the size of the Chinese-led APSCO, 
with three nations (Indonesia, Mongolia, and Thailand) having signed both the Chinese 
and Indian space conventions. 
         India is also eyeing the growing demand for commercial space launches. Jane's 
Defence Weekly analyst Rahul Bedi says, “the success of India’s space program 
represents a technological evolution of the whole space programme in India”.278 He also 
notes, “India is very competitive in launching satellites and it further cements that 
reputation”.279 Since its inception, the ISRO has earned approximately 2.5 billion dollars 
from its commercial launches and is poised to continue its success not only in launches 
but also in satellite manufacturing.280 ISRO is already getting preparing to launch several 
payloads from France and Russia in 2009 and 2010, which would constitute a direct 
challenge to China.281 
        One recent event that might dampen India’s rise in the arena of commercial space is 
the recent malfunction of one of its satellites that it had sold to Europe’s Eutelsat. 
Although the satellite was part of a joint venture between the European Astrium and 
ISRO’s Antrix, the problem “can almost certainly be traced to the Antrix-provided 
platform”.282 Similarly to the recent Chinese loss of NIGCOMSAT-1, only time will tell if 
there is any negative backlash from this satellite failure for India. 
       In addition to India, Japan is also another Asian nation that may have concerns about 
China’s growing space prowess. Since Japan is not officially associated with either 
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APSCO or CSSTEAP, it created its own Asian-focused space organization in 1993, the 
Asian-Pacific Space Agency Forum (APRSAF).283 One key distinction between 
APRSAF and APSCO or the CSSTEAP is that there are no requirements to sign a 
convention in order to participate. Interested nations are free to attend annual conferences 
as they deem necessary. According to the APRSAF website, its official mission statement 
is to: 
Discuss current space related issues and possible cooperation among 
countries mainly from the Asia-Pacific region. APRSAF intends to ensure 
wider participation of space agencies, government officials, regional and 
international organizations and institutions responsible for applying space 
technology, as well as space agencies from outside the region and private 
sectors as observers.284 
 
        One recent APRSAF-led initiative that is gaining soft power momentum is the 
SENTINEL Asia program, which is designed to provide advance warning for the 
disproportionate number of natural disasters that plague the Asia-Pacific region. This 
Japanese-led effort is an excellent example of bringing space-derived information into a 
usable format that can have dramatic, life-saving applications for all Asian nations. Since 
it draws on “satellite derived products and imagery from all available Earth observing 
geostationary, or low-earth orbiting satellites, including meteorological satellites that 
provide routine data to the region,” it can be a powerful tool for alerting nations of 
impending floods or other natural disasters that are going to affect their region.285 Since it 
is an idea of Japanese origin, it can also be a powerful reminder that Japan also wants to 
exert a measure of influence in the region using space-based assets. 
        Table 4, below, lists the Asian countries that either have signed or simply are 
participating members in the four main Asia-focused space organizations. SCOSA 
membership is defined by ASEAN membership, so this is likely a fixed group. APSCO 
and CSSTEAP are not defined by outside organizations, so the number of nations may 
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increase or decrease. APRSAF, while the largest in pure numbers, also has the loosest 
structure. Without a binding agreement from other countries, Japan relies solely on the 
goodwill of other nations to be willing to support APRSAF objectives. Note that the 
ASEAN nations of Indonesia and Thailand are the only two that are full-fledged 
members of all four groups. 
 
  
                         Table 4: Asian Space Organizations: Member Nations286 
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          Due to long-standing political reasons, the four aforementioned space organizations 
may still remain autonomous in some respects; yet they have already displayed a 
willingness to work together on several projects of mutual benefit. However, they may 
still present a soft power challenge to China in the space arena. Beijing will likely see 
enduring competition occurring in the commercial space sector, especially with regard to 
telecommunications satellites and services and, more importantly, reliable space lift. 
India and Japan both possess indigenous launch capabilities, with North and South Korea 
planning to join them as 2010. 
 
IV. 7. CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES: RIVAL, COMPETITOR, OR      
           PARTNER ? 
           If Asia, in general, is cautiously accommodating China’s rise as a space power 
with a watchful eye, what stance should Washington take? U.S.-Chinese space 
cooperation started on September 9, 1988, when the Reagan administration approved the 
first-ever export licenses allowing Chinese rockets to launch U.S.-built satellites.287 
China and the United States later joined efforts in space in 1992 when the China 
Telecommunications & Broadcast Satellite Corporation purchased the orbiting Spacenet- 
1.288 This relationship grew to the point where China was allowed to launch U.S.-built 
satellites on its rockets, until the Space Systems/Loral “scandal” broke out in 1996, 
resulting in years of political aftershocks and stringent satellite export restrictions 
following the release of the Cox Commission Report’s investigation in 1999. China’s 
ASAT “scientific experiment” in January 2007 still lingers in the minds of many policy 
makers in Washington. Given this once positive and now more negative relationship of 
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space relations, how should Washington view China and its space program: rival, 
competitor, or possible cooperative partner? 
  
    China as a Military Space Rival 
    Viewing the Chinese space program as hostile and Beijing a future rival in space seems 
to be the predominant line of thinking amongst U.S. politicians and many think tanks. 
The Chinese ASAT test still rings loudly in their ears, tainting each judgment that is 
made on China’s aspirations in space. The 1997 Loral scandal in which missile 
technology was allegedly transferred to China against standing U.S. satellite export 
policy is another black mark against any mention Chinese space cooperation. More 
vitriolic statements were issued during the March 2006 House Appropriations Committee 
subcommittee hearing on “Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, 
and Related Agencies” when Rep. Tom DeLay quipped, “We have a space race [with 
China] going on right now and the American people are totally unaware of this”.289 Frank 
Wolf, representative from Virginia and subcommittee chairman, added, “If China beats 
us there [to the Moon], we will have lost the space program. They are basically, 
fundamentally in competition with us”.290 This is further evidenced in Senator Kyl’s 
January 29, 2007 speech at the Heritage Foundation in which he claimed that China’s 
rhetoric and insistence on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) was 
merely a ruse to prevent “further progress by the United States in space while allowing it 
to covertly catch up”.291 Despite repeated remarks by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that 
the test was not directed at anyone nor did it change China’s position on the peaceful use 
of space, many remain skeptical of the test’s true intent. While this may have been an 
attempt to drum up the China threat in order to secure more funding for NASA’s lunar 
programs, it may also reflect a more general trend of regarding any Chinese effort in 
space with the utmost suspicion. 
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         Johnson-Freese’s address to the April 2007 conference “Collective Security in 
Space: Asian Perspectives on Acceptable Approaches” explained the more pessimistic 
outlook in greater detail. She cited the three main commissions that color U.S. space 
policy, namely the “Rumsfeld,” “Cox,” and “Rumsfeld Space” Commissions as 
bolstering a purported China “threat” in space.292 After the 2007 ASAT test, the “U.S. 
voices of moderation [which had] made some progress [against the ‘China threat’ 
camp]…had [been] drowned out”.293 Thus, while there were positive efforts to keep the 
threat perceptions from spiraling out of control, they were effectively extinguished by the 
Chinese ASAT demonstration. In her analysis of the 2004 DoD report on Chinese space 
activities, Johnson-Freese noted that “five out of six Chinese launches were considered 
militarily relevant breakthroughs, though all but one were civilian launches”.294 Given the 
downward trend in U.S.-China space relations and the strong anti-China bias from the 
Pentagon, she pessimistically concluded that chances would be grim for any real 
improvement “in the near-term and even in the next administration”.295 
           In addition to the ASAT test and issue of technology transfer are China’s track 
record on human rights and less-than-effective governance of intellectual property rights, 
which are often cited as moral and economic reasons to keep Beijing isolated. The 
“crystal clear” message that China continues to receive from the United States is that the 
“[U.S.] is not interested in cooperative space programs with China”.296 Thus, the 
prevailing sentiment that China is a space rival and not a country that the United States 
can work with in space seems firmly entrenched in some circles, at least for the time 
being.  
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 China as an Economic Space Competitor 
       Despite a general worldwide trend of nations’ space budgets either remaining static 
or in decline, China is actively building, buying and launching satellites into space. 
Although there may not be tremendous growth in actual sales of satellites, there is an 
increase in the demand for satellite applications and services.297 Relying on U.S. export 
licenses to regulate purchases abroad of satellite or satellite components to “influence 
over how other countries participate in the commercial launch services market” may be a 
strategy that is backfiring.298 With the recent purchase of a French Alcatel-built satellite, 
proudly announced as “ITAR-free,” as well as Chinese space launches for Brazil, 
Nigeria, now Venezuela and soon Bolivia, the U.S. space industry is going to face more 
and more competition.299 This view was recently echoed by Jim Albaugh, president and 
CEO of Boeing Integrated Defense Systems. In an address to the 2008 National Space 
Symposium, he stated that “[in space]…like the business world you have to be worried 
about the threat of that new guy who just opened up a shop down the street…of course, 
I’m talking about China and India”.300 John Hamre, former deputy secretary of defense, 
in his introductory comments at an April 3, 2006 Center for Strategic and International 
Studies event titled “Global Space Agenda: China,” also noted, “somehow, our strategy 
of containment, if its goal is to prevent you [China] from becoming a spacefaring nation, 
it isn’t working”.301 
        China’s competitive edge in space launch is due to several factors. First, it offers 
insurance for all launches in case of failure through the China Insurance Company.302 
Second, its lower wage scales allow it to underbid competing offers by “at least 10 to 15 
percent”.303 Third, as part of its outreach to developing nations, it allows a “flexible 
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payment method” as part of the package.304 Taking these factors as a whole, the launch 
portion can save prospective customers “$50 million per rocket” over the average higher-
priced U.S. and European alternatives.305 The French-based Thales Aleniaspace has 
already taken advantage of this and had China launch six of its satellites since 2006.306 
      From this perspective, unless Washington starts modifying its space policy (see 
recommendations in Conclusion), other nations, including China, will continue to eat 
away at U.S. lead in space. This becomes all the more critical with the decommissioning 
of the shuttle and U.S. inability to get manned missions to the ISS without paying for 
Russian flights. Looking to private space enterprises such as Space X, which finally had a 
successful launch on its fourth Falcon-1 launch, may be a short-term solution. But 
especially when it comes to manned missions, launcher reliability is paramount. The 
Russian Soyuz and Chinese Shenzhou are both man-rated space vehicles that have a 
strong history of success thus far, and may be the only options for the U.S. to continue to 
send astronauts into space. 
 
       China as a Space Partner 
       If the United States truly wants to engage China in a positive and productive manner 
regarding space, this perspective argues that Washington needs to see China as a potential 
partner and not just as “rival” or “competitor.” As Nicolas Peter notes, “…few if any 
countries in the world today can stand alone in space activities, demonstrating therefore 
the importance of cooperation”.307 Although Washington continues to snub 
Beijing’s request to serve as a partner on the ISS, there may be some actual merit to 
allowing China to participate in the program. One obvious benefit would be China’s 
ability to participate financially and allow for some cost-sharing. With its large foreign 
reserves and sovereign wealth fund, China is in a better position than other ISS 
participants (e.g., Brazil, Italy) to help offset some of the continual development and 
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sustainment costs. Another potential benefit in Chinese collaboration would be greater 
insight and transparency into China’s own space program and technical capabilities. 
Richard Fisher, vice president of the International Assessment and Strategy Center, 
offered a slightly puzzling, pessimistic argument in favor of denying Chinese 
participation in the ISS, as follows: 
When we look to our own potential future cooperation, dialogue, space 
dialogue with China, we have to keep this [potential for military dual-use 
purposes] in mind. That when we invite—if we were to invite—a Chinese 
astronaut onto the space shuttle, that the information technology that that 
single individual might pick up could be turned into a potential Chinese 
military space platform.308 
 
       There is scant evidence, however, that a man orbiting in space would truly add any 
significant military advantage, especially concerning information technology. 
Johnson-Freese dryly noted that neither the Americans nor Soviets could find any 
particular advantage to having a manned military presence in space and that “there seems 
little basis for such a fear [that Chinese ingenuity would find value in a military-man-in 
space that eluded the U.S. military]”.309 
          On a more optimistic note, space cooperation between NASA and the CNSA, its 
Chinese counterpart, through increased contact and exchanges of information, could help 
overcome mutual mistrust and ambiguity. Over the long-term, it could potentially give 
way to strengthened confidence and assurance of each others’ intentions and concerns 
about space, reducing ambiguity and increasing transparency across the board. Even 
during the height of the Cold War, America held a joint space docking exercise with the 
Soviet Union in 1975 which “achieved important technical and political 
breakthroughs”.310 If the United States could work with its bitter communist rival during 
the dark days of the Cold War, according to the “space partner” perspective, Washington 
could safely find a place for Sino-U.S. space cooperation in the 21st century. 
        Working in a more direct fashion with the Chinese, it could be argued, may also 
help keep their space program directed at peaceful objectives and dampen any secret 
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ambitions to militarize outer space. Even some Chinese scholars would agree on this 
point, including Wu Chunsi from Fudan University’s Center for American Studies. He 
suggests that Washington’s active engagement China in space could help create a clean 
break between the civilian and military programs and that “the commercial and civilian 
elements of China’s space program will see their capabilities grow along with a sense of 
independence from the military”.311 Furthermore, Wu argues, “if China follows a path of 
isolation, exclusion will only deepen its suspicion and resentment, and the commercial 
and civilian sectors…would be forced to seek help from the government, or even the 
military”.312 Thus, instead of acting as a “space hyper-power,” a U.S. invitation to the 
Chinese to become a space partner could arguably soften its image as a global hegemon, 
and also increase U.S. soft power and credibility with the Chinese.313 
       So, I can say that China has a flexible approach to space projects and international 
cooperation, which is clearly a key component of its foreign policy. With the CBERS 
joint project with Brazil, it was a “two-way input of money and technology,” whereas the 
VENESAT-1 project with Venezuela was a “simple exchange of cash for products, 
services, and technology.” Logan notes that this fluid approach to brokering space-related 
projects internationally reflects the Chinese “‘win-win’ approach to deal making”.314 As 
of 2001, China had “space-related technical and economic cooperation with over 70 
countries,” and that number has probably grown since then.315 With Russian backing, 
China is also trying to shape the rules of the road for future space conduct through U.N. 
space organizations and fora. Thus, China has cleverly adapted a strategy of using space-
related projects, programs, and agreements as a soft power tool of international relations. 
John Logsdon, former director of George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute, 
comments, “It’s no accident that these [Brazil, Venezuela, and Nigeria] are resource-rich 
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countries. China is using its space capabilities as part of its broader diplomatic efforts”.316 
Thus, China is seeking out those nations that it can enter into mutually beneficial 
relations with, trading and sharing space technology for natural resources that it does not 
enjoy in abundance. 
        Other nations in Asia, namely India and Japan (but also North and South Korea and 
even Iran) also desire to have successful space programs that can bring international 
prestige and soft power influence in the region. While it appears that healthy competition 
will peacefully co-exist with cooperation in space, it is an area that demands faithful 
attention and monitoring to ensure it does not go down a more militaristic and destructive 
path. With a firmer grasp of China’s space program from an international context, the 
final chapter returns to the United States to examine current U.S. space policy and to 
offer recommendations for a new approach aimed at addressing the challenges posed by 
China’s rising soft power in space while better serving U.S. interests. 
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                                           CONCLUSION 
 
        As mentioned at the outset of this thesis, the number of nations that recognize the 
advantages of space applications and are investing resources to join the space-faring elite 
is only on the increase. The explosion of downstream services provided by precision 
navigation and timing (PNT), the growth of direct-to-home telecommunications 
broadcasting, as well the positive impacts of remote sensing, weather forecasting, and 
monitoring for natural disasters continue to drive more interest into peaceful uses of outer 
space. Having an indigenous space capability also increases political prestige and “soft 
power” and satisfies techno-nationalism.317 China, like many other nations, is not simply 
standing idly by on the sidelines. It is actively promoting itself as a provider of these 
services to others, especially technologically weaker nations. 
       With the rise of China’s presence in both space and space-related commercial 
services, and their growth of space-derived soft power internationally, American 
interests, political, economic, and otherwise, are sure to be impacted. In a recent Air and 
Space Power Journal, Trevor Brown notes: 
 
The problem for the United States is that other nations believe it seeks to 
monopolize space in order to further its hegemonic dominance...[;] Poor 
U.S. diplomacy on the issue of space weaponization contributes to 
increased geopolitical backlashes of the sort leading to the recent decline 
in U.S. soft power…which, in turn, has restrained overall U.S. national 
power despite any gains in hard power.318 
 
        Focusing on the general decline of U.S. soft power and global influence, he adds, 
“Due to U.S. losses of soft power, the international community now views with suspicion 
any legitimate concerns that the United States may have about protecting critical assets in 
space”.319 Looking at current U.S. space policy and strategy, what choices does 
Washington make to encourage or restrain China’s rise? What can America do differently 
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to rebuild its own soft power? This final section examines that issue and offers 
recommendations for U.S. space policy. 
 
      CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE U.S. SPACE POLICY 
       What follows is a list of considerations and recommendations for U.S. policy on 
space. It is my sincere hope that consideration and implementation of these suggestions 
will help restore confidence in U.S. intentions in space as well as promote U.S. space soft 
power worldwide.320 
       There are a number of areas that could be considered “low-hanging fruit” that are 
well within in other means to start rebuilding positive American influence and soft power 
and engendering amicable feelings with existing partners in space. 
 
       Unilateral Measures 
       Normally, the term “American unilateralism” connotes a sinister notion, especially 
for foreign audiences. However, there are areas in the context of space where unilateral 
measures may be extremely positive and productive. Washington should pursue a stated 
policy of no first-use of space weapons or, perhaps more directly, a policy of no first-
deployment of space-based weapons. Ever since the United States walked away from the 
ABM Treaty in June 2002, placed missile interceptors at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and 
started negotiating first with Poland and Czech Republic about potential sites for future 
missile defense sites. Obama administration shifted gears from Bush administration plans 
that were confirmed in February that Romania would host the first deployment of 
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) land-based interceptors in 2015 and that Poland would host 
the next site in 2018. Turkey and Bulgaria may play a role as well, according to 
administration officials, who are seeking to soothe Russian concerns by inviting Moscow 
to join U.S.-NATO missile defense plans many countries have begun to view U.S. as an 
aggressor.321 Moscow has reacted by threatening to develop even more capable nuclear 
warheads.322 China has also reacted strongly by reiterating its stance that National Missile 
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Defense (NMD) “does not contribute to global stability…and violates the ABM 
Treaty”.323 Although these are ground-based defensive systems, they also show American 
unwillingness to abandon any notion of placing similar weapons in space. By showing a 
willingness to support a joint resolution on “no space weapons” with Russia, and perhaps 
one that also involved China, Washington would be clearly demonstrating resolve that it 
is serious about keeping space peaceful for future generations. 
          The Obama administration may indeed be willing to take a lead with regards to 
cooperative space policy. According to the official White House website, “The 
Obama-Biden Administration will restore American leadership on space issues, seeking a 
worldwide ban on weapons that interfere with military and commercial satellites”.324 
While that sounds good initially, that phrase is immediately followed with more language 
on “assess[ing] possible threats to U.S. space assets and the best options…for countering 
them”.325 Nonetheless, this still seems to be a step in the right direction and hopefully 
will be actually carried out in the near-term. 
         While any U.S.-led movement towards a ban on space weapons would be met with 
widespread international support, Washington also should issue a clearly stated 
moratorium on ASAT activities. The February 2008 U.S. shootdown of a malfunctioning 
satellite did not engender much goodwill. Although numerous statements were made that 
it was not in retaliation for the Chinese ASAT test, it did not appear that many people 
believed that the on-board hydrazine constituted a severe enough risk to humanity to 
justify even low-altitude satellite destruction. By promulgating a clearly-worded 
unilateral resolution or joint declaration with Russia and China to neither place nor use 
space weapons, coupled with a self-imposed ban, or at least a moratorium, on all ASAT 
testing, Washington would thereby broadcast a strong signal of intent to remain non- 
aggressive in space and maintain it as a sanctuary for the peaceful use of all mankind.326 
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Bottom line, these efforts could help counter China’s own hawkish defense establishment 
policymakers who may be seeking to balance or hedge against any attempt of U.S. space 
dominance and shape a new direction for China’s own space program.327 
   
        Debris Mitigation 
        One oddly positive result from the largely negative Chinese ASAT test was a new 
focus on space debris. This event served as a catalyst that galvanized more support and 
serious efforts to address this issue. More people are now aware that an “F-BOM” 
(Fratricide by Orbital Mechanics)328 can be nearly as dangerous as an “H-bomb” in space. 
The recent collision of a U.S.-built Iridium communications satellite and an old 
Russian Cosmos relay satellite added more fuel to these concerns.329 
        In light of this new awareness of and concern about space debris, the U.S. should 
continue to proactively lead and guide full implementation of the Inter-Agency Debris 
Coordinating Committee (IADC) Debris Mitigation Guidelines to ensure they do not 
remain a passive, non-legally binding “voluntary” commitment as they are currently, but 
a true international standard for all future space launches and operations, including those 
from China.330 
 
        Rules of the Road or a “Space Code of Conduct” 
        To date, there is no real internationally recognized legal framework on how a nation 
should conduct itself in space. Given the recent U.S. trend to vote against U.N. 
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resolutions (e.g., PAROS), perhaps a non-binding agreement that had a limited scope of 
very general and basic norms might be a good place to start. Michael Krepon, in an 
address to the U.N. NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security, offered some 
interesting priorities for establishing a “code of conduct”: 
           •        Prohibiting harmful interference with space objects; 
           •        Sharing space surveillance data (space situational awareness or SSA); 
           •        Abiding by the debris mitigation guidelines; 
           •        Devising and implementing a traffic management system for space; and 
           •        Providing accurate and timely launch notice and registration.331 
           Keeping the language simple and in a “rules of the road” format would allow for 
countries, including America, to sign on without much political risk. As time went along, 
the hope is that this could start to create a norm, or expected pattern of behavior, and 
eventually end up in a binding, codified treaty. If America took the lead in drafting and 
supporting such a “space code of conduct,” it could serve as a positive message that 
would erase some of the stigma that currently taints other nations’ views of our own 
space ambitions and, in the long run, could have a positive impact on keeping space a 
safer place.332 It might also steal some of the thunder from Beijing and its efforts to 
curtail U.S. influence through the U.N. and help engender goodwill for Washington. 
 
        Discard Inflammatory Policy Language 
        A neutral observer who casually reviews both the official U.S. National Space 
Policy as well as prominent statements made by leading U.S. officials would easily arrive 
at the conclusion that America is intent on an aggressive, hegemonic approach to space 
security. Since the Rumsfeld Commission, one concept that received a lot of press was 
the idea of a “space Pearl Harbor”.333 Whether this was intended to refer to a surprise 
attack against the United States designed to cripple U.S. ability to wage war or to destroy 
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the American entire satellite constellation, or both, is unclear. What is clear is the 
misimpression it left on both uninformed citizens and members of Congress: U.S. space 
assets are at risk, a rogue nation can “blind” the U.S. military would be utterly helpless to 
fight. With one ASAT test under its belt, China appeared to fill the role of that rogue 
nation. In light of a U.S. response of intervention in a Taiwan Strait scenario, many war 
planners assume China will try to attack U.S. space assets. 
        While the U.S. military is indeed dependent in many ways on space assets, the 
notion of a “space Pearl Harbor,” at least regarding attacking satellites, is overstated. 
Many of the military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) “birds” and Defense 
Support Program (DSP) early-warning satellites are out at Geosynchronous (GEO) orbit, 
approx. 35,000 km (22,300 miles) away. The Global Positioning System (GPS) is in 
Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), which is approx. 22,000 km (12,000 miles) away. Both the 
Chinese and American ASAT events occurred in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), roughly 
between 160 – 2000 km (100 – 1,240 miles). While America does operate sensitive 
reconnaissance satellites at LEO that are indeed vulnerable, the technology, both in 
tracking something beyond LEO and trying to “hit” it with a seeker-equipped killer 
satellite, as well as the required size of the launch vehicle due to the large amount of fuel 
to get something to MEO or GEO orbits, is not something a rogue nation would be able 
to easily access. Although it may seem rash to dismiss the “space Pearl Harbor” concept 
as “much ado about nothing,” it is clear by applying simple orbital mechanics and space 
physics that it is nearly impossible to destroy all U.S. space assets without a tremendous 
number of large, multi-stage boosters and highly accurate, large kinetic-kill vehicles, and 
a lot of dead time where America does nothing in response. Having a capability to “kill a 
satellite” at LEO does not in any way portend any ability to do the same at MEO or GEO, 
which are 10-20 times further away, and several orders of magnitude more difficult to 
track, identify, and destroy.334 Thus, the idea of a China “space threat” wiping out U.S. 
space resources seems less plausible and more unrealistic than previously imagined. 
          Similarly, looking at the 2006 version of U.S. National Space Policy, some of the 
language used in the “Principles” is ambiguous, borderline hostile, and disconcerting: 
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The United States considers space capabilities -- including the ground and 
space segments and supporting links -- vital to its national interests. 
Consistent with this policy, the United States will: preserve its rights 
capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others 
from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do 
so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to 
interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space 
capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests; 
 
The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or 
other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of 
space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair 
the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, 
testing, and operations or other activities in space for U.S. national 
interests.335 
 
          How exactly will Washington “deny” other people using space? If one buys the 
argument that a rogue nation will attack one of U.S. satellites, does that mean a nuclear 
retaliatory strike? And why is the United States the only country with a “right” to conduct 
activities in space? With China looking at its own GPS-like Beidou constellation, Yaogan 
remote-sensing satellites, Shentong and Fenghuo military communication satellites, does 
Beijing also have to right to “deny” the use of space if someone tries to interfere with its 
constellation? If not, Washington is assuming special privileges only for itself. This 
unilateral approach smacks of a schoolyard bully who insists on getting his own way 
without having to answer to anyone else, and cuts dangerously deep into America’s soft 
power. Is this really the approach that Washington—the world’s leading democracy— 
wants to take? Does this not make the previously stated principles of “peaceful purposes” 
mere fluff and leave us seeming to be hypocritical? I think there are more countries than 
just the United States that also believe “freedom of action in space is important” and also 
wish to derive “economic prosperity and national security” from space.336 How could 
Washington use such innate desires to promote its security in space? 
          My simple recommendation is to drop the emotionally-charged rhetoric of “space 
dominance,” “space superiority” and “space control.” It is extremely divisive and 
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unnecessary language that drives people away from U.S. side, and presumes that nations 
will forever willingly accept an inferior posture and subject themselves to whatever 
Washington decides. Some people advocate an “in your face from space” attitude, even 
to the point of stating in no uncertain terms that “the United States is the morally superior 
choice to seize and control space”337 and “…deploying a space-based BMD 
would…guarantee domination of space”.338 Washington sincerely risks greater isolation 
and resistance if it thinks it can “seize and control” anything with no regard to world 
opinion in this manner, and may actually provide stimulus to Chinese hard-liners who 
may want to justify a more aggressive approach to space security vis-à-vis America. 
 
         Support PAROS & TCBM 
         Beyond changing the way U.S. signal intentions in space through policy and 
doctrine, continually being the only nation voting against the United Nations Resolution 
for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) and the Transparency and 
Confidence Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (TCBM) sends a clear message 
that Washington is completely unwilling to abide by world consensus. American 
obstinance also potentially signals intentions of one day placing weapons in space by 
refusing to remove that option from the table. The language of the document states: 
 
Recognizing that prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a 
grave danger for international peace and security, call upon all States, in 
particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the 
goal of the peaceful use of outer space, and of the prevention of an arms 
race in outer space, and to refrain from actions contrary to that goal and to 
the relevant existing treaties in the interest of maintaining international 
peace and security and promoting international cooperation.339 
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         Christina Rocca, U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, and Under 
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph offer this 
standard reply to why Washington won’t support it: “There is no arms race in space and 
therefore no problem for arms control to solve”.340 However, the interpretation of that 
carefully worded message is, “Why limit ourselves when it won’t prevent other countries 
from developing space weapons technology?” As space policy expert Clay Moltz 
observed, “[the 2006 Policy] had walked to the threshold of weaponization but had failed 
to cross it overtly,”341 leaving an ambiguous loophole to pursue space weapons if national 
security required it. If the United States is truly serious about the peaceful use of space 
for all nations, it should obligate itself, through voting for international resolutions, to 
cease and desist from developing space weapons. If Washington continues to vote against 
PAROS, it is possibly risking U.S. isolation in space due to Chinese soft power skills and 
space diplomacy, which currently track with world opinion. 
 
        Radical ITAR Reform 
        Finally, as many others do, I recommend a wholesale review and revision of the 
U.S. export control process, namely the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR).342 The National Research Council’s Committees on Science, Security and 
Prosperity and on Scientific Communication and National Security recently issued a 
brilliant report on the sad impact of U.S. export controls and how they negatively affect 
American national and economic security. Although export controls were originally 
intended to safeguard military technology and American supremacy, the unfortunate 
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reality is that times have changed dramatically, and not in U.S. favor. Some of the 
report’s findings include: 
     •        The current system of export controls now harms our national and homeland  
               security; 
     •        The system of export controls is fundamentally broken and cannot be fixed by  
               incremental changes below the Presidential-level; and 
     •        A new system of export controls can be more agile and effective, recognizing  
              that, under current global conditions, risks to national security can be mitigated      
              but not eliminated.343 
           Over the past decade or so, the Bush administration and Congress, which 
“remained reluctant to loosen these [ITAR] restrictions,” had the “net effect…to 
strengthen relations between other satellite producers (such as Russia and the United 
Kingdom) and a growing list of clients in East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East”.344 
This also includes France and China, which have teamed together to produce “small, 
communication satellites that don’t include U.S. parts and therefore exempt from a 
complex web of U.S. technology-export controls [ITAR]. They are as much as 40 percent 
cheaper to assemble, test and launch than rival American models”.345 Even Europe, with 
its long military alliance and historical ties to the United States, is not reacting favorably 
to U.S. ITAR controls. Vincent Sabathier, former French space attaché, notes, “Very little 
cooperation regarding space-based security applications goes on between Europe and the 
United States. Meanwhile, ITAR itself has created barriers to prevent such 
cooperation”.346 In addition to the dramatic rise of “ITAR-free” space commerce, a report 
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that “Not only have these 
requirements [ITAR] harmed our domestic technological and manufacturing base, but 
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they have had a drastic negative effect on both the hard and soft power utilization of 
space”.347 
        Nobody recommends scrapping export controls altogether. But facing diminishing 
foreign demand for U.S.-built space technology and the growing loss of space technology 
and human capital, there needs to be radical changes. The “Beyond Fortress America” 
report recommends several solutions, as follows: 
         •         The President should restructure the export control process within the federal     
                    government to prevent harm to national security and technology base and   
                    help promote U.S. economic competitiveness; 
         •         A new coordinating center that would fall under the auspices of the National  
                    Security Advisor should be established; and 
         •         There should be an economic competitiveness “exemption” that eliminates  
                    exports controls on dual-use technologies where they, or their functional  
                    equivalents, are available without restriction in open markets outside the  
                    United States.348 
        Changes of this magnitude would probably involve an uphill battle, potentially 
triggering turfs wars among State, Commerce, Defense, and the Congress, as well as 
fighting the dreaded inertia of bureaucratic path dependency and red tape. Though not an 
impossible effort, it will take considerable fortitude and bold leadership to overturn more 
than a decade of U.S. over-reaction to the Chinese threat and Draconian export controls 
regarding the space industry. Failure to make substantive changes in this area may bring 
about more “ITAR-free” satellites and space technology marketed not only by the 
Chinese, but also India, Japan, as well as allies in Europe, as well as cause more 
irreversible the already hemorrhaging U.S. space industry.       
         Where from here? Looking at the bottom line, space is no longer the Cold War race 
between the Americans and the Soviets. As Nicolas Peter notes, “major space-faring 
nations are now using space as a political tool to reach non-traditional partners in order to 
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build trusting relationships across political borders, illustrating that foreign policy and 
space are now increasingly overlapping... [;] greater international cooperation is the way 
forward for major space activities”.349 And China certainly is making its mark in the 
space world, and is not going to leave the space arena anytime soon. Johnson-Freese 
comments that “They [the Chinese] want to play a leadership role for developing 
countries that want to get into space. It’s just a win-win for them…they are making 
political connections, it helps them with oil deals and they bring in hard currency to feed 
back into their own program to make them even more commercially competitive”.350 The 
sooner Asia and the United States cautiously accommodate a more powerful, space-
capable China, the more they will able to leverage and perhaps even shape its rise, 
weaning it away from a military race in space, and perhaps ensuring there is truly 
peaceful development and benefit from space for all nations. 
          America has shown the rest of the world far too much edgy “hard power” 
diplomacy, including in the space realm. In doing so, it has isolated itself and thereby 
harmed its own security. Especially with regard to China, the United States is in danger 
of mischaracterizing the motivations and rationales behind China’s space program and, as 
a result, pursuing counterproductive policies that could actually create incentives for 
other countries to side with China against American interests in space. We have already 
seen a drop in U.S. dominance in commercial space and the rise of ITAR-free programs 
as a result of U.S. insecurities about technology transfer. The Chinese ASAT test is 
usually seen as a military test purely designed as an asymmetric capability to attack 
America’s overdependence on space assets, normally in the context of a Sino-U.S. 
wartime scenario (i.e., over Taiwan).351 But as China expands its number of military and 
civilians satellites and thereby incurring the same space-borne liabilities as the U.S., why 
is it not also vulnerable to a space attack? Bottom line, as Johnson-Freese argues, 
“…other countries are clearly interested in working with China on space, regardless of 
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the American stance. Therefore, the United States can either be involved and retain some 
measure of control through leadership, or watch from the sidelines”.352 
         It is time for America to shift permanently away from hegemonic ambitions in 
space, dismantle the idea of space-based weapons and space control, and instead turn 
towards promoting space cooperation through peaceful projects that can truly serve 
mankind and preserve the heritage of space as a sanctuary.353 U.S. have no longer 
monopoly on space technology, and U.S. lead is precariously slipping away in 
commercial space. If Washington avoids inflammatory rhetoric and demonstrates a 
sincere willingness to usher in a new era of space cooperation, taking care to build in 
adequate verification and compliance mechanisms, the rest of the world will follow our 
lead. For the sake of U.S. own interests and long-term security, sitting on the sidelines is 
not an option. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
352
 Joan Johnson-Freese, “Space Wei Qi: The Launch of Shenzhou ,.” Naval War College Review, Vol. 
LVII, No. 2, Newport, RI: Naval War College (Spring 2004), 121-145. 
353
 See Lieutenant Colonel Bruce M. DeBlois, “Space Sanctuary,” Airpower Journal, Vol. XII, No.4, 
Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University (Winter 1998), available online at: 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.html (accessed June 9, 
2010). 
104 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
Albaugh, Jim.“Reaffirming U.S. leadership in space.” Space News, May 26, 2008. 
Alden, Chris. “China in Africa”, London: Zed Books 2007 
Aldhous, Peter & Anil Ananthaswamy. “Asia blazes trail to the final frontier.” New 
                Scientist, Vo. 188, Iss. 2522, October 22-28, 2005, 8-9. 
Ameh, John. “Reps make u-turn on NigComSat-I project.” SpaceDaily.com, February 24, 
            2009, http://www.spacemart.com/reports/Reps_Make_U_turn_On_ 
             NigComSat_I_Project_999.html  
Arostegui, Martin. “Chavez: Venezuela to launch defense satellite.” Washington Times, 
                  September 12, 2007         
                  http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/sep/12/chavezvenezuela- 
                  to-launch-defense-satellite/  
Asia-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications  
          (APMCSTA). Website: http://www.apmcsta.org/  
Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization. Website: 
          http://www.apmcsta.org/Apsco/Motives.aspx 
Ball, Desmond. “China pursues space-based intelligence gathering capabilities,” Jane’s 
         Intelligence Review, December 01, 2003. 
Behrens, Carl E. Space Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, Commercial 
               Competition, and Satellite Exports. Congressional Research Service Report 
               IB93062, March 20, 2006. 
Berkofsky, Axel. “EU, China: Honeymoon is over.” International Relations and Security 
                   Network, May 29, 2008, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security- 
                   Watch/Detail/?id=88403&lng=en  
Blaker, James R. “Avoiding another cold war: the case for collaboration with China.” 
              American Security Project (online), November 6, 2008                      
              http://www.americansecurityproject.org/files/Avoiding%20Another%20 
              Cold%20War.pdf  
“Bolivia creates space agency for Chinese satellite”, ChinaDaly, Xinhua, February 2,     
                2010  http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-02/11/content_9463814.htm 
105 
 
Brachet, Gerard. “Collective security in space: a key factor for sustainable long-term use 
               of space.” In Collective Security in Space: European Perspectives, edited by     
               John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz, and Emma S. Hinds, 1-16. Washington  
               D.C: Space Policy Institute, Elliot School of International Affairs, George  
               Washington University, January 2007, 
               http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/Collective%20Security%20in%20Space%20- 
               %20European%20Perspectives.pdf  
“Brazil, China to postpone joint satellite launching to 2011”, News Xinhuanet (English),       
               February 11, 2010 
               http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/sci/2010-02/11/c_13172079.htm 
Brown, Peter J. “China gets a jump on U.S. in space.” Asia Times Online, October 25, 
              2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JJ25Ad02.html  
_____. “China lost in SE Asian space.” Asia Times Online, October 10, 2008, 
              http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JJ10Ae01.html  
_____. “China making leaps in space.” Asia Times Online, January 9, 2009, 
               http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KA09Ad01.html  
_____. “China needs sharper eyes in space.” Asia Times Online, October 16, 2008, 
               http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JJ16Ad02.html  
Brown, Trevor. “Soft power and space weaponization.” Air and Space Power Journal, 
             Vol. XXIII, No. 1, Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press (Spring 2009), 
             66-72, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/spr09.pdf 
Bulloch, Chris. “China’s satcoms: relying on the West.” Interavia, Volume 53, Issue 619, 
               April 1998, 44-46. 
Burleson, Daphne. Space programs outside the United States: All exploration and 
                 research efforts, country by country. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & 
                 Company, Inc. Publishers, 2005. 
_____. Spacecraft launch sites worldwide. North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc. 
            Publishers, 2007. 
Burrows, William E. The survival imperative: using space to protect Earth. New York, 
                NY: Forge, Tom Doherty & Associates, 2006. 
 
106 
 
Casarini, Nicola. “Asia’s space tigers bare their teeth.” Asia Times Online, November 9, 
               2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IK09Ad02.html  
Chandler, David L. “Confident China joins space elite.” New Scientist, Vol. 180, Iss. 
                 2418, October 25-31, 2003, 6. 
_____. “Why do the Chinese want to conquer space?” New Scientist, Vol. 180, Iss. 2418, 
              October 25-31, 2003, 8.  
“Chandrayaan-1 gets closer to Moon”. SpaceDaily.com, October 31, 2008, 
                           http://www.moondaily.com/reports/Chandrayaan_1_Gets_ 
                           Closer_To_Moon_999.html  
“Chavez: Venezuela to launch defense satellite”, Washington Times, September 12, 2007, 
                 http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/sep/12/chavez-venezuela-to- 
                 launchdefense-satellite/  
Cheng, Dean. “China and the international space community: A brief overview.” Chinese 
            Military Update, Volume 1, Issue 5, October 2003, 1-3. 
_____. “China’s space program: Civilian, commercial, & military aspects.” CAN 
              Conference Report, May 2006. 
               http://www.cna.org/documents/china%20space%20conference 
              %20final.pdf?from search=1  
“China-Russia Mars mission set for takeoff.” MarsDaily.com, January 5, 2009, 
              http://www.marsdaily.com/reports/China- 
              Russia_Mars_mission_set_for_takeoff_999.html  
“China and the second space age.” Futron Corporation, October 15, 2003, 
            http://www.futron.com/pdf/resource_center/white_papers/China_White_paper.pdf    
“China builds and launches a satellite for Nigeria.” Washington Post, May 14, 2007: 
             A11. 
“China completes enclosure of land for fourth satellite launch center,” SpaceDaily.com, 
             November 19, 2007, 
              http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_Completes_Enclosure_Of_Land_For_ 
              Fourth_Satellite_Launch_Center_999.html  
 
 
107 
 
“China hails spacewalk ‘heroes’ and sets eyes on Moon.” SpaceDaily.com, September 
            29, 2008, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_hails_spacewalk 
             _heroes_and_sets_eyes_on_moon_999.html  
“China helps Nigeria develop communication technology.” Xinhua People’s Daily 
            Online, June 14, 2008, 
            http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6430119.html  
“China launches first data relay satellite.” Xinhua News Agency, April 26, 2009, 
             http://www.wsichina.org/morningchina/article.asp?id=2638  
“China launches its first Moon orbiter.” Xinhua News Agency, 
             http://www.chinaview.cn/rygc/index.htm  
“China plans own satellite navigation system by 2015,” SpaceDaily.com, January 19,  
              2009, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_plans_own_ 
              satellite_navigation_system_by_2015_state_media_999.html  
“China plans space station with module launch in 2010.” SpaceDaily.com, March 1, 2009, 
             http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_Plans_Space_Station 
             _With_Module_Launch_In_2010_999.html 
“China reveals its first full map of Moon surface.” Xinhuanet.com, November 12, 2008, 
             http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-11/12/content_10347379.htm  
“China signs 16 int’l space cooperation agreements, memorandums in five years.” 
              People’s Daily (Online), October 12, 2006, 
              http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200610/12/eng20061012_311154.html 
“China to deliver telecom satellite to Pakistan.” SpaceDaily.com, October 17, 2008, 
             http://www.spacemart.com/reports/China_To_Deliver_Telecom_Satellite_To_Pa 
              kistan_999.html  
“China to hand over satellite to Venezuela.” Spacemart.com, January 23, 2009, 
             http://www.spacemart.com/reports/China_To_Hand_Over_ 
             Satellite_To_Venezuela_999.html  
“China to launch FY-4 weather satellite around 2013,” SpaceDaily.com, October 14,     
             2008, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_To_Launch 
             _FY_4_Weather_Satellite_Around_2013_999.html  
 
108 
 
“China to launch probe to Mars with Russian help in 2009.” RIA Novosti, May 12, 2008,                      
              http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/2008/space-081205- 
              rianovosti01.htm  
“China to launch second lunar probe before end of 2011.” Spacedaily.com, November 13,  
             2008, http://www.moondaily.com/reports/China_To_Launch 
              _Second_Lunar_Probe_Before_End_Of_2011_999.html  
“China to orbit Venezuela-Uruguay satellite in 2008.” RIA Novosti, February 4, 2008, 
             http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/2008/space-080402- 
             rianovosti01.htm  
“China to start making trial model of ‘Long March 5’ carrier rocket.” China Radio       
              International, March 28, 2008, 
              http://www.wsichina.org/morningchina/article.asp?id=2371  
“China’s second civil aerospace industrial base to be established in Xi’an” China Radio 
                International, April 8, 2008, 
                http://www.wsichina.org/morningchina/article.asp?id=2477  
“China’s ‘divine vessel’ carries nation to space of wonder.” People’sDaily.com (English), 
                 September 28, 2008, 
                 http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90881/6507834.html  
“China’s Fengyun-3A satellite starts trial business operation,” SpaceDaily.com,  
                November 20, 2008, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_plans_own 
                 _satellite_navigation_system_by_2015_state_media_999.html 
“China’s future astronauts will be scientists.” SpaceDaily.com, December 5, 2008 
                http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_Future_Astronauts 
                _Will_Be_Scientists_999.html  
“China’s growing involvement in Latin America.” Power and Interest News Report, June 
               12, 2006, http://www.pinr.com/index.php (accessed under, “Reports by Region,  
               “Asia,” on April 25, 2008). 
“China’s new carrier rocket to debut in 2014.” Xinhuanet.com (online), March 2, 2008, 
              http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/02/content_7702780.htm            
 
 
109 
 
“China’s rulers look to space to maintain Olympic pride.” SpaceDaily.com, September 9,      
               2008, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Chinas_rulers_look_to_ 
               space_to_maintain_Olympic_pride_999.html  
“China’s space development—A tool for enhancing national strength and prestige.” East 
               Asian Strategic Review 2008. National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, 
               Japan: Japan Times, 2008, 19-35, 
               http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/east-asian/pdf/2008/eastasian_ 
               e2008_01.pdf  
“China's First Mars Mission Delayed,” MarsDaily.com, October 2, 2009 
               http://english.cas.cn/Ne/CN/200910/t20091010_44888.shtml           
“China’s fourth Space Center to be completed by 2015”, SpaceDaily, March 9, 2010                                        
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Chinas_Fourth_Space_Center_To_Be_Compl
eted_By_2015_999.m 
“China chooses first women astronauts”, SpaceDaily, March 10, 2010 
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_chooses_first_women_astronauts_999.
html                                       
“China’s space industry takes off.” SpaceDaily.com, November 6, 2008, 
             http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_Space_Industry_Takes_Off_999.html            
“Chinese scientists start studying samples from Shenzhou-7.” SpaceDaily.com, October 8,     
              2008, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Chinese_Scientists_Start_Studying 
              _Samples_From_Shenzhou_7_999.html  
“China to launch Tiangong-1 at the end of next year”, People's Daily (Online), March 9,  
             2009 http://sinodefence.com/space/project/project921-phase2.asp   
“Chinese Lunar Exploration Program”. People’s daily online, February 6, 2010 
                 http://english.people.com.cn/90002/91752/index.html            
Clark, Stephen. “China launches for record 11th time in 2008.” Space.com, December 24, 
            2008, http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/sfn-081224-china-recordlaunch. 
             html  
Cliff, Roger. The military potential of China’s commercial technology. Santa Monica, 
           CA: RAND, 2001. 
 
110 
 
Cliff, Roger, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin Pollpeter. Entering 
          the dragon’s lair: Chinese antiaccess strategies and their implications for the 
          United States. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007. 
“Closer relations between ESA and China.” European Space Agency website, 
              http://www.esa.int/esaCP/SEMJL5ULWFE_index_0.html  
Collina, Z. Tom. U.S. Taps Romania for Missile Defense.      
               http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_03/MissileDefense 
Convention of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO). 
                     http://www.apmcsta.org/File/pdf/Convention%20on%20APSCO%20.rar 
Covault, Craig. “Building great wall: China is offering the sale of new satellite 
               components to Europe and Asia to compete against U.S. Companies.” Aviation 
               Week & Space Technology, Volume 158, Issue 25, June 23, 2003, 37. 
_____. “China, Iran pursue imaging spacecraft.” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 
             Volume 155, Issue 14, October, 2001, 45. 
_____. “China’s space encore.” World News & Analysis, Volume 159, Number 17, 
              October 27, 2003, 30. 
____. “Manned program advances Chinese space technology.” Aviation Week & Space 
              Technology, Volume 151, Issue 22, November 29, 1999, 28. 
_____. “Transparency crucial to Chinese international space role.” Aviation Week & 
             Space Technology, May 4, 2008, 
            http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=ne 
            ws/aw050508p2.xml  
Cox, Christopher. U.S. national security and military/commercial concerns with People’s 
          Republic of China. Washington D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives, Select 
          Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the 
          People’s Republic of China, 1999. 
“Damaged Nigerian satellite can’t be recovered.” SpaceDaily.com, November 12, 2008, 
                  http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Damaged_Nigerian_satellite 
                  _cant_be_recovered_officials_999.html  
Dinerman, Taylor. “China, the U.S., and solar space power.” The Space Review, October 
                   22, 2007, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/985/1 
111 
 
 
Dohlman, Carl Everett. “Space Power and US Hegemony: Maintaining a Liberal World  
                  Order in the 21st Century,” in John M. Logsdon and Gordon Adams, eds.,      
                  Space Weapons:Are They Needed? (Washington, DC: Space Policy Institute,  
                  George Washington University, October 2003). 
______. Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (London: Frank Cass, 
              2002), 165. Emphasis mine. 
Dumbaugh, Kerry. China-U.S. relations: Current issues and implications for U.S. policy. 
                     Congressional Research Service Report RL33877, December 9, 2008. 
Drew, Jill. “Space inspires passion and practicality in China.” Washingtonpost.com, 
            September 25, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ 
            content/article/2008/09/23/AR2008092302649.html  
“Earthbound.” Economist.com, August 21, 2008,  
                          http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11965352  
East Asian Strategic Review 2006. National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, Japan: 
            Japan Times, June 2006. 
Eckert, Paul. “U.S., China urged to work out space security regime.” Reuters.com 
             (online), September 18, 2008, 
              http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN1837446920080918  
“Envisat monitoring China floods as part of Dragon programme.” European Space 
               Agency website, http://www.esa.int/esaCP/SEM8MD808BE_index_0.html                
“ESA-MOST Dragon cooperation programme.” European Space Agency website: 
            http://earth.esa.int/dragon/  
Fahri, Paul. “U.S., media settle with Wen Ho Lee.” Washington Post, June 3, 2006, A01, 
           http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/02/AR20060602 
           01060.html  
Filho, José Monserrat. “Brazilian-Chinese space cooperation: An analysis.” Space Policy, 
           Vol. 13, Issue 2, May 1997, 153-170. 
Fisher, Richard D., Jr. “China’s close call.” Wall Street Journal Asia, October 31, 2008, 
             http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122539460905385099.html?mod=googlenews_w 
             sj  
112 
 
_____. “Shenlong space plane advances China’s military space potential.” International 
              Assessment and Strategy Center, December 17, 2007, 
              http://www.strategycenter.net/printVersion/print_pub.asp?pubID=174 (accessed 
             October 18, 2008). 
_____. “Space to manoevre – satellite attack upsets US space supremacy.” Jane’s 
               Intelligence Review, March 01, 2007. 
Ford, Peter. “What’s behind Asia’s Moon race?” Christian Science Monitor, October 25, 
          2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1025/p06s01-woap.html 
 Forden, Geoffrey. “Viewpoint: China and Space War,” Astropolitics, Vol. 6, Number 2    
               (May-August 2008):138-153, for analysis of what China would have  
                to do to attack U.S. space assets. 
Foust, Jeff. “China, competition, and cooperation.” The SpaceReview.com, April 10, 
           2006, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/599/1  
Freeman, Ambassador (ret.) Chas W., Jr. “A China policy for the Twenty-First Century.” 
                Strategic Studies Quarterly. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, Fall  
                2008, http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Fall/freeman.pdf   
Gallagher, Nancy. “Towards a reconsideration of the rules for space security,” in John 
                  Logsdon & Audrey Shaffer, eds. Perspectives in Space Security. Washington, 
                  D.C.: George Washington University, Space Policy Institute, December 2005, 
                  http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/PERSPECTIVES_ON_SPACE_SECURITY.pdf  
Gauthier, Lieutenant Colonel Kathryn L. China as peer competitor? Trends in nuclear 
                weapons, space, and information warfare.  
                Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, July 1999. 
Gentile, Carmen. “Analysis: China dedicated to Nigerian oil.” Energy Daily, July 18,                
                2008,  http://www.energydaily. 
                com/reports/Analysis_China_dedicated_to_Nigerian_oil_999.html   
Gertz, Bill. “New U.S. defenses sought to counter Beijing buildup.” Washington Times, 
           October 1, 2008, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/oct/01/new-    
            usdefenses-sought-to-counter-beijing-buildup/  
Gilks, Anne. “China’s space policy: review and prospects.” Space Policy, Vol. 13, Issue 
            3, August 1997, 215-227. 
113 
 
Hagt, Eric. “China’s ASAT test: Strategic response.” China Security. World Security 
          Institute, Vol. 3 No.1, Winter 2007, 31-51, http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_3.pdf 
Handberg, Roger and Zhen Li. Chinese space policy: A study in domestic and 
                  international politics. New York, NY: Routledge, 2007. 
Hardwood, Bill. “U.S. and Russian satellites collide.” CBSNews.com, February 11, 2009, 
                    http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/02/11/tech/main4792976.shtml 
Harvey, Brian. China’s space program – From conception to manned spaceflight. UK: 
              Praxis Publishing, 2004. 
Hitchens, Theresa. “U.S.-Sino relations in space: From ‘war of words’ to Cold War in 
                 space?” China Security. World Security Institute, Vol. 3 No. 1,  
                 Winter 2007, 12-30, http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_2.pdf  
Hitchens, Theresa & David Chen. “Forging a Sino-US ‘grand bargain’ in space.” 
                 Space Policy, Volume 2, 2008, 
                 http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/HitchensGrandBargain.pdf  
Hoey, James H. “The global reach of Chinese soft power: China’s rise and America’s 
           decline?” M.A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 2007. 
Holden, Constance. “East of ESA.” Science, Volume 293, Issue 5529, July 20, 2001. 
              “HK [Hong Kong], Macao scientists expected to participate in China’s     
               aerospace project.” SpaceDaily.com, December 11, 2008, 
                http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/HK_Macao_Scientists_Expected 
                _To_Participate_In_China_Aerospace_Project_999.html  
Hulse, Janie. China’s expansion into and U.S withdrawal from Argentina’s 
           telecommunications and space industries and the implications for U.S. national 
           security. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
           September 2007, 
           http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=806             
“India eyes larger slice of satellite launch sector.” SpaceDaily.com, October 23, 2008, 
             http://www.spacemart.com/reports/India_eyes_larger_slice_of_satellite_launch_s 
             ector_999.html  
 
 
114 
 
“India not engaged in space race with China.” SpaceDaily.com, October 13, 2008, 
            http://www.spacetravel. 
            com/reports/India_Not_Engaged_In_Space_Race_With_China_999.html 
“India poised to be major player in satellite manufacturing.” SpaceDaily.com, October 30,  
            2008, http://www.spacemart.com/reports/India_Poised_To_Be_Major 
            _Player_In_Satellite_Manufacturing_999.html  
“Insight: The FUTRON competitiveness index.” Satmagazine.com, May 2008, 
                http://www.satmagazine.com/cgi-bin/display_article.cgi?number=197209387 
“Institute for Defense Studies & Analyses”, Space Technology and Soft-Power: A  
                 Chinese Lesson for India, http://www.idsa.in/node/3154/17  
Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) Debris Mitigation 
            Guidelines:http://www.iadc-online.org/docs_pub/IADC- 
            101502.Mit.Guidelines.pdf. 
_____. “Status of activity of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee.” 
              IADC Document No. IADC 08-01, February 2008, http://www.iadconline. 
              org/index.cgi?item=docs_pub  
“ITAR and the American way.” Spacewar.com, January 28, 2009, 
              http://www.spacewar.com/reports/ITAR_And_The_American_Way_999.html         
Jayaraman, K.Y. “ISRO-built satellite fails after five weeks.” SpaceDaily.com, February  
                    2, 2009, http://www.spacemart.com/reports/ISRO_Built_Satellite 
                     _Fails_After_Five_Weeks_999.html  
Johnson, Ed. “China, following astronauts’ return, plans space lab for 2011.” 
                Bloomberg.com, September 28, 2008, 
                http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080& 
                sid=aZJYoiU9yivw&refer=asia  
Johnson-Freese, Joan. “A new US-Sino space relationship: Moving toward cooperation.” 
                Astropolitics, Volume 4, Issue 2, Summer 2006, 131-158. 
_____. China’s space ambitions. IFRI Security Studies Center Proliferation Papers, 
             Summer 2007, 
              http://www.ifri.org/files/Securite_defense/China_Space_Johnson_Freese.pdf  
 
115 
 
_____. The Chinese space program: A mystery within a maze. Malabar, Florida: Krieger 
            Publishing, 1998. 
_____. Space as a strategic asset. NY: Columbia University Press, 2007. 
_____. “Space Wei Qi: The launch of Shenzhou V.” Naval War College Review, Vol. 
              LVII, No. 2, Newport, RI: Naval War College (Spring 2004), 121-145, 
              http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_2_57/ai_n6112689%20  
_____. “Strategic communication with China: What message about space?” China 
              Security. World Security Institute, Vol. 2 No. 2, Summer 2006, 37-57, 
              http://www.wsichina.org/morningchina/article.asp?id=1994 
Johnson-Freese, Joan and Andrew S. Erickson. “The Emerging China-EU space 
               partnership: A geotechnological balancer.” Space Policy, Vol. 22, Issue 1, 
               February 2006, 12-22. 
Johnson-Freese, Joan and Roger Handberg. Space, the dormant frontier: Changing the 
               paradigm for the 21st Century. Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1997. 
John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz, and Emma S. Hinds, 17-27. Washington 
         D.C: Space Policy Institute, Elliot School of International Affairs, George 
         Washington University, January 2007, 
          http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/Collective%20Security%20in%20Space%20- 
          %20European%20Perspectives.pdf  
Jones, Morris. “China sets sights on first space station.” SpaceDaily.com, October 3,  
            2008, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_Sets 
            _Sights_On_First_Space_Station_ 999.html  
_____. “Souped up rockets for Shenzhou.” SpaceDaily.com, October 29, 2008, 
              http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Souped_Up_Rockets 
             _For_Shenzhou_999.html 
_____. “The politics of Shenzhou.” SpaceDaily.com, September 8, 2008, 
               http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/The_Politics_Of_Shenzhou_999.html 
Joseph, Robert. “Remarks on the President’s national space policy.” Spaceref.com, 
             December 14, 2006, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=22773 
Kagan, Robert. The Return of History and the End of Dreams. Great Britain,  
             Atlantic Book, 2008. 
116 
 
Kan, Shirley. China: Possible missile technology transfers under U.S. satellite export 
          policy—Actions and chronology. Congressional Research Service Report 98- 
         485F, October 6, 2003. 
Kaufman, Mark. “U.S. finds it’s getting crowded out there: Dominance in space slips as 
                  other nations step up their efforts.” WashingtonPost.com, July 9, 2008, A01, 
                  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ 
                 content/article/2008/07/08/AR2008070803185_pf.html 
Khalilzad, Zalmay M., Abram N. Shulsky, Daniel L. Byman, Roger Cliff, David  
               T. Orletsky, David Shlapak, and Ashley J. Tellis. The United States and a rising 
                China: Strategic and military implications. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999. 
Kislyakov, Andrei. “Outside view: Asian missile power.” Spacewar.com, October 24,  
                   2008, ttp://www.spacewar.com/reports/Outside_View_Asian_ 
                    missile_power_999.html 
Klein, John J. Space warfare: Strategy, principles and policy. New York, NY:  
            Rutledge, 2006. 
Krepon, Michael. “A code of conduct for outer space.” Paper presented at Discussion 
               held at United Nations Headquarters by the NGO Committee on Disarmament, 
               Peace and Security, in cooperation with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 
               New York, NY, April 12, 2007, http://disarm.igc.org/april12krepon__untalk.pdf 
_____. “China's military space strategy: An exchange.” Survival, Vol. 50, Issue 1, 1 
              February 2008, 157- 98, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330801899512 
Kurlantzick, Joshua. “China’s charm: Implications of Chinese soft power.” Carnegie 
                     Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief No. 47, June 2006, 
                     http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB_47_FINAL. 
_____. “China’s charm offensive.” Commentary, Volume 122, Issue 3,  
               October 2006, 35-39. 
_____. ‘Charm offensive: how China's soft power is transforming the world’, Yale  
              University Press, 2007, 6. 
_____. “China’s Latin leap forward.” World Policy Journal, Fall 2006, 
               http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/latin_leap.pdf  
 
117 
 
Lambakis, Steven J. On the edge of Earth: The future of American space power. 
                   Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2001. 
Lampton, David M. The three faces of Chinese power. Berkeley, CA: University of 
                 California Press, April 2008. 
Lee, Min. “China aims to put man on Moon by 2020.” Space.com, November 27, 2005, 
         http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/ap_051127_china_moon.html  
Lewis, James A. “China as a Military Space Competitor,” Perspectives on Space Security 
             (Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, December 2005) available at: 
              http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/040801_china_space_competitor.pdf 
Lewis, Jeffrey G. “Engage China, engage the world.” adAstra, Spring 2005, 
            http://www.space.com/adastra/china_engagement_0505.html  
_____. The minimum means of reprisal: China’s search for security in the nuclear age. 
            Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007. 
“Liftoff for China space mission.” BBC News, September 25, 2008, 
               http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7634404.stm 
Lino, Carlos De Oliveira, Maury Gonçalves Rodrigues Lima, and Genésio Luiz Hubscher.     
         “CBERS: An international space cooperation program.” Acta 
          Astronautica, Volume 47, Issues 2-9, July-November 2000, 559-564. 
Logan, Jeffrey. China’s space program: Options for U.S.-China cooperation. 
            Congressional Research Service Report RS22777, May 21, 2008, 
             September 29, 2008. 
Logan, Sam. “Venezuela’s space escort.” International Relations and Security Network 
            (ISN), November 7, 2008, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security- 
            Watch/Detail/?coguid=5AE5FE60-65CB-1031-3E09- 
            DB38287013E8&lng=en&id=93564  
Lozano, Leticia. “China’s charm offensive.” Euromoney, London (UK), March 2005. 
             “Macao University to analyze data from China’s Moon probe.” SpaceDaily.com, 
              December 15, 2008, 
              http://www.moondaily.com/reports/Macao_University_ 
              To_Analyze_Data_From_China_Moon_Probe_999.html  
 
118 
 
Manzo, Vince. “U.S. policy brief: The need for a strategic dialogue with China.” Center 
              for Defense Information, 2008, 
             http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/StrategicDialoguePolicy.pdf  
Martel, William C. & Yoshihara, Toshi. “Averting a Sino-U.S. space race.” The 
             Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2003: 19-35. 
Mayerchak, M. Patrick. “Asia in Space: The Programs of China, Japan, and Indonesia,”  
                      In Wayne C. Thompson & Steven W. Guerrier, ed., Space: National        
                       Programs and International Cooperation, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,     
                       1989), 93. 
McDonald, Bruce W. China, space weapons, and U.S. security. Council on Foreign 
                   Relations, Council Special Report Number 38, September 2008, 
                    http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments 
                   /China_Space_CSR38.pdf 
Medeiros, Evan S., Roger Cliff, Keith Crane, and James C. Mulvenon. A new direction 
                 for China’s defense industry. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005. 
Metzler, P. Gregory. “China in space: Implications for U.S. military strategy.” Joint 
               Forces Quarterly, Issue 47, Fourth Quarter 2007, 
               http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i47/22.pdf  
Miller, Marc. PLA mission beyond Taiwan. Colloquium brief from U.S. Army War 
            College, National Bureau of Asian Research, and The Bush School of 
            Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
            Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2008 
            (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB897.pdf  
Moltz, James Clay. “Space jam.” NewYorkTimes.com, February 18, 2009 
            http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/opinion/19moltz.html?_r=1&ref=opinion 
_____. The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National 
            Interests. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008. 
Moltz, James Clay & Erik R. Quam. “Asian approaches to space security.” James Martin 
            Center for Nonproliferation Studies, May 10, 2007, 
             http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/070510.htm  
 
119 
 
Moore, Mike. Twilight war: The folly of U.S. space dominance. Oakland, CA: 
             Independent Institute, 2008. 
Mulvenon, James C., and Thomas J, Bickford. “The PLA and the telecommunications 
                   industry in China,” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, ed., The 
                   People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, RAND Conference 
                   Proceedings, 1999, http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF145/  
Nair, Kiran Krishan. Space: The frontiers of modern defence. New Delhi, India: 
         Knowledge World (in association with Centre for Air Power Studies), 2006. 
         National Research Council Committees on Science, Security and Prosperity & 
         Committee on Scientific Communication and National Security. Beyond fortress 
         America: National security controls on science and technology in a globalized 
         world. National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, 
         http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12567 
“New space tracking ship to serve Shenzhou VII.” Xinhua News Agency, April 13, 2008, 
            http://www.wsichina.org/morningchina/article.asp?id=2510  
Ng, John. “China aims for the stars.” Asia Times Online, October 14, 2006, 
         http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HJ14Ad01.html (accessed May 6, 2008). 
“NIGCOMSAT-2: Fifty Nigerian engineers back from China.” August 15, 2007, 
                            http://www.mynaijanews.com/content/view/507/2/  
Noichim, Chukeat. “Promoting ASEAN space cooperation.” Space Policy, Volume 24, 
                 Issue 1, February 2008, 10-12. 
Nweke, Remmy. “Experts agitate for NIGCOMSAT 2, 3.” ITREALMS Online, November 
               26, 2008, http://itrealms.blogspot.com/2008/11/experts-agitate-for-nigcomsat-2- 
               3.html  
Nye, Joseph S., Jr. Soft power: The means to success in world politics. NY: Perseus 
         Books Group, 2004. 
____. Joseph S., Jr. ‘Soft Power’, Foreign Policy, No. 80, Fall 1990, p 153-170 
____. Joseph S., Jr. ‘Soft Power’: A New Focus at China’s Two Sessions, National     
          People’s Congress, People’s Republic of China, URL: www.npc.gov.cn   
____. Joseph S., Jr. ‘The Rise of China’s Soft Power’, The Wall Street Journal-Asia, 29  
         December 2005. 
120 
 
____. Joseph S., Jr. “Think Again: Soft Power.” See  
           http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/think-again-soft-power 
Nye, Joseph S., Jr. and James A. Schear, eds. Seeking stability in space: Anti-satellite 
          weapons and the evolving space regime. Lanham, MD: Aspen Strategy Group and 
          University Press of America, 1987. 
Oberg, James. “Year of the rocket.” IEEE Spectrum, Spring 2001, 
             http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=00920033  
Pace, Scott. “China’s human spaceflight program: Achievements and prospects.” 
           PowerPoint slides, Space Policy Institute, Elliot School of International Affairs, 
           George Washington University, October 17, 2008, 
           http://www.gwu.edu/~cistp/news/PACE101708/Pandas%20in%20Orbit%201008 
           08-presented.pdf  
Pae, Peter. “Third world sets sights on space.” Los Angeles Times, October 14, 2003, A1. 
Pan, Esther. “China’s soft power initiative.” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, 
         May 18, 2006, 
         http://www.cfr.org/publication/10715/chinas_soft_power_initiative.html  
Pang, Zhongying. “The Beijing Olympics and China’s soft power.” Brookings Institution, 
          September 4, 2008, 
           http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0904_olympics_pang.aspx?p=1          
Pasco, Javier. “Toward a future European space surveillance system: Developing a 
            collaborative model for the world.” In Collective Security in Space: European 
            Perspectives, edited by John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz, and Emma S. Hinds, 
            51-62. Washington D.C: Space Policy Institute, Elliot School of International 
            Affairs, George Washington University, January 2007, 
             http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/Collective%20Security%20in%20Space%20- 
             %20European%20Perspectives.pdf  
Pasztor, Andy. “China to launch satellite for France’s Eutelsat.” WallStreetJournal.com, 
               February 25, 2009, 
               http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123550142763361701.html? 
               mod=googlenews_wsj#articleTabs%3Darticle 
 
121 
 
_____. “China’s rocket service makes inroads, irks U.S.” Wall Street Journal, October 5, 
              2007, A13. 
Patterson, Lieutenant Colonel J. Barry. China’s space program and its implications for 
                  the United States. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, April 19, 1995. 
Peter, Nicolas. “The changing geopolitics of space activities.” Space Policy, Volume 22, 
           Issue 2, May 2006, 100-109. 
Pollpeter, Kevin. Building for the future: China’s progress in space technology during 
                 the tenth 5-Year plan and the U.S. response. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
                 Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2008, 
                 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=852 
_____. “Competing perceptions of the U.S. and Chinese space programs.” China Brief, 
              Volume 7, Issue 1, January 10, 2007, 4-6, 
               http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/cb_007_001.pdf  
_____. “The Chinese vision of space military operations.” In China’s Revolution in 
              Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese 
             People’s Liberation Army, ed. James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, 329-370, 
             CNA Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia, December 2005, 
             http://www.cna.org/documents/doctrinebook.pdf  
_____. “The stars of China’s space program: The rise of a “space gang”?” China Brief, 
              Volume 7, Issue 17, September 19, 2007, 2-6, 
               http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/cb_007_017.pdf  
Powell, Alvin. “Questions remain about China in space.” Harvard University Gazette, 
              November 3, 2005, http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2005/11.03/11- 
              space.html  
Purnendra, Jain and Gerry, Groot, ‘Beijing’s Soft Power Offensive’, Asia Times Online,      
                   May 17, 2006. 
Puska, Colonel Susan M., ed. People’s Liberation Army after next. Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
            Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 2000. 
Rabinovitch, Simon. “The rise of an image-conscious China.” China Security. World 
                      Security Institute, Volume 4, Issue 3, Summer 2008, 33-47, 
                      http://www.chinasecurity.us/pdfs/CS11_2 
122 
 
Rhea, John “Need for More International Cooperation,” in Wayne C. Thompson &  
           Steven W. Guerrier, ed., Space: National Programs and International       
           Cooperation, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 112. 
Rincon, Paul. “China ‘could reach Moon by 2020’.” BBC News (online), July 15, 2008, 
              http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7506715.stm 
_____. “What’s driving China space efforts?” BBC News (online), September 25, 2008, 
               http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7635397.stm  
“Rohrabacher condemns use of Chinese rockets.” SpaceMart.com, February 26, 2009, 
                        http://www.spacemart.com/reports/Rohrabacher_Condemns 
                         _Use_Of_Chinese_Rockets_999.html  
Rotberg, I. Robert. ed., China Into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence, Washington D.C.:         
                Brookings Institution Press 2008. 
Rueda, Jorge. “Chavez cheers satellite launch.” Washington Times (online), October 30, 
             2008, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/oct/30/chavez-       
              cheerssatellite-launch/  
Sabathier, Vincent G. “Europe and China.” adAstra, Spring 2005, 
                  http://www.space.com/adastra/china_europe_0505.html   
Sample, Ian. “Lunar eclipse: US retreat leaves China leading way in race to return to  
              moon”  
              http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2010/feb/02/lunar-us-china-race-moon  
Saunders, Phillip. China’s global activism: Strategy, drivers, and tools. Washington, 
                 D.C., National Defense University Press; Institute for  
                 National Strategic Studies, 
                 October 2006, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occasional_Papers/OCP4.pdf  
_____. “China’s future in space: Implications for U.S. security.” adAstra, Spring 2005, 
               http://www.space.com/adastra/china_implications_0505.html  
“Second Chinese-Brazilian satellite fulfills 5-Year mission in orbit.” SpaceDaily.com, 
               October 23, 2008, http://www.spacemart.com/reports/Second_Chinese_ 
                Brazilian_Satellite_Fulfils_5_Year_Mission_In_Orbit_999.html  
 
 
123 
 
Sengupta, Somini. “India prepares Moon launch.” NewYorkTimes (online), October 21,  
                  2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/world/asia/22indiamoon. 
                  html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin  
Shachtman, Noah and Geoffrey Forden. “How China loses the coming space war.” 
                    Wired.com, January 10, 2008, http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-     
                     thechin.html (part 1), http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-the-ch-   
                    1.html (part 2), http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-the-ch-2.html     
                    (part 3), 
Sheehan, Michael. The International Politics of Space, Routledge, 2007 
Smith, Marcia S. Space launch vehicles: Government activities, commercial competition, 
            and satellite exports. Congressional Research Service Report IB93062,  
            January 4, 2006. 
Solomone, Stacey. “China’s space program: The great leap upward.” Journal of 
                  Contemporary China. Volume 15, Issue 47, May 2006, 311-327. 
Space Industry Final Report 2007. Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National 
           Defense University, Spring 2007, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgibin/ 
           GetTRDoc?AD=ADA475093&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf  
“Space mission commander gives clues on first Hong Kong astronaut.” Spacedaily.com, 
             December 8, 2008, http://www.spacetravel. 
             com/reports/Space_Mission_Commander_Gives_Clues_On_First_Hong_K 
             ong_Astronaut_999.html  
“Space sci-tech industrial base launched in Shanghai,” People’s Daily (online), January  
             23, 2006 http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200601/23/ 
             eng20060123_237625.html 
Spencer, Jack & Kathy Gudgel. “The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review: China and 
                space—The unmentionable issues.” The Officer, September 2005, 67-68. 
Spring, Baker. “Satellite shootdown was a necessary operation.” Heritage Foundation 
            Webmemo #1823, February 22, 2008, 
            http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/wm1823.cfm  
“Stars in their eyes.” The Economist.com, April 7, 2008, 
          http://www.economist.com/daily/chartgallery/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10976407 
124 
 
Stoullig, Jean-Michel. “Rumsfeld Commission warns against ‘space Pearl Harbor’.” 
              SpaceDaily.com, January 11, 2001, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo- 
              01b.html  
Talpalariu, Dan. “NASA prefers US commercial rockets over Russian ones.” Softpedia 
                   Spacenews, October 10, 2008, http://news.softpedia.com/news/NASA-     
                    Prefers-US-Commercial-Rockets-Over-Russian-Ones-95422.shtml  
Taverna, Michael A. “India, China to expand Earth-observing nets.” Aviation Week & 
                Space Technology, October 29, 2001, 87. 
“Technical problems’ shut down Nigerian satellite.” SpaceMart.com, November 12, 2008, 
                    http://www.spacemart.com/reports/Technical_problems_shut_down_ 
                    Nigerian_satellite_999.html  
Tellis, Ashley J. “China's military space strategy.” Survival, Volume 49, Issue 3, 41 – 72, 
           September 1, 2007, 
            http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis_china_space1.pdf  
“The ongoing erosion of the US space industrial base.” SpaceDaily.com, January 21,  
          2009, http://www.gpsdaily.com/reports/The_Ongoing_Erosion_Of_ 
           The_US_Space_Industrial_Base_999.html  
Thompson, Colonel David J. & Lieutenant Colonel William R. Morris, China in space: 
                   Civilian and military developments. Maxwell Paper No. 24, Maxwell AFB,     
                    Ala.: Air War College, August 2001. 
Thompson, Wayne C. & Steven W. Guerrier, ed., Space: National programs and 
                    international cooperation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989. 
“Top 50 space industry and manufacturing services.” Space News International, August 
          6, 2007, http://a52.g.akamaitech.net/f/52/827/1d/www.space.com/images 
           /Top502006_final.pdf  
“U.S. freezes Chinese space company assets for Iranian missile aid.” Aviationweek.com, 
          June 26, 2006,  http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp? 
          channel=space&id=news/CHI06266.xml  
“U.S. response was brought to the Third Session of the CD on September 2, 2008”. Text  
           is available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/ 
           papers08/3session/CD1847.pdf 
125 
 
“U.S. said losing space markets, hobbled by own policy.” Reuters Online, February 19,  
            2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/scienceNews/ 
             idUSN1928868620080219?sp=true 
“U.S. to China: No arms race in space.” Newsmax.com, February 13, 2007, 
           http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/ic/2007/2/13/132957.shtml?s=ic  
Utomi, Pat. “China and Nigeria.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 4, 
            2008, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080603_utomi_nigeriachina.pdf 
Vaccaro, David. “Who will lead the next space race?” FUTRON Corporation (online), 
                October 1, 2008 
                 http://www.futron.com/pdf/resource_center/articles/Who_Will_Lead.pdf    
“Venezuela and China to build satellite.” SpaceDaily, November 1, 2005, 
                    http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-05zzzzzzzzzzq.html  
Wang, Cong. “China beams with pride, joy after successful space mission.” People’s 
            Daily.com (English), September 29, 2008, 
             http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90881/6508481.html  
“Washington, we have a problem.” Economist.com, August 21, 2008, 
                        http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11965279 
Weeden, Brian. “How China ‘wins’ a potential space war.” China Security. World 
                Security Institute, Vol. 4 No. 1 Winter 2008, 134-147, 
                 http://www.wsichina.org/cs9_9.pdf  
Weitz, Richard. China-Russia security relations: Strategic parallelism without 
              partnership or passion? Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
             College, August 2008, 
              http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB868.pdf  
White Paper. China’s national defense in 2008. People’s Republic of China, Information 
           Office of the State Council, January, 2009, 
           http://www.china.org.cn/government/central_government/2009- 
           01/20/content_17155577.htm  
White Paper. China’s space activities. People’s Republic of China, Information Office of 
           the State Council, November 22, 2000, 
           http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/china/wp112200.html  
126 
 
White Paper. China’s space activities in 2006. People’s Republic of China, Information 
           Office of the State Council, October 12, 2006, 
           http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/china/wp2006.pdf  
WMD Insights. “Special report: Chinese anti-satellite weapon test – The shot heard 
            ‘round the world.” WMD Insights: Issues and Viewpoints in the International 
             Media (http://www.wmdinsights.com/I13/I13_EA1_SP_PRC_ASAT.htm), 
Wolter, Detlev. “Collective security in outer space and international law: A European 
              perspective.” In Collective Security in Space: European Perspectives, edited by 
              Wortzel, Larry M. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and space warfare:      
              Emerging United States-China military competition. American Enterprise     
              Institute, October 17, 2007,       
              http://www.aei.org/docLib/20071017_SpaceWarfare.pdf  
_____. “The rules of engagement: The Russia model.” adAstra, Spring 2005, 
               http://www.space.com/adastra/china_russia-model_0505.html  
Wu, Chunsi. “Development goals of China’s space program.” China Security. World 
        Security Institute, Vol. 2 No. 2, Summer 2006, 107-115, 
         http://www.wsichina.org/attach/cs2_9.pdf  
Xin, Dingding. “Boom year for space launches.” China Daily, February 19, 2008, 
         http://www.wsichina.org/morningchina/article.asp?id=1994  
Yardley, Jim. “Blocked by U.S., China finds its own way to space.” International Herald 
                Tribune, May 23, 2007 http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/23/news/china.php 
                Also, “Snubbed by U.S., China Finds New Space Partners.” New York Times,      
                May 24, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/24/world/asia/24satellite.html                  
______. ‘China uses space Technology as Diplomatic Trump Card’, International Herald  
                Tribune, May 24, 2007. 
______. “Snubbed by U.S., China Finds New Space Partners,” New York Times, May 24, 
                2007. 
Yuan, Jingdong. Asia-Pacific security: China’s conditional multilateralism and great 
           power entente. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
           January 
 
127 
 
Zhao, Yun. “The 2002 space cooperation protocol between China and Brazil: An 
           excellent example of South-South cooperation.” Space Policy, Vol. 21, Issue 3, 
           August 2005, 213-219. 
Zhu, Yilin. “Fast-track development of space technology in China.” Space Policy, May 
          1996, 139-142. 
Zhu Yilin & Xu Fuxiang. “Status and prospects of China’s space programme.” Space 
         Policy, Vol.13, Issue 1, February 1997, 69-75. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
 
 
128 
 
                                              LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Chinese Government Launches (1970-2021): Future Launch Projection from 
Futron’s ASCENT Study .................................................................................................28 
Figure 2: FUTRON Corporation’s Space Competiveness Index, 2008…………………29 
Figure 3: 2009 Space Competitiveness Index: Total Aggregate Scores by Country…....30 
Figure 4: Russian Soyuz, Chinese Shenzhou, and U.S. Orion Capsules Comparison…...44 
Figure 5: Mars Missions: (L) Phobos-Grunt and (R) Yinghuo-l………………………...46 
Figure 6: Artist Illustration of Sino-Russian Mars Probe……………………………….47 
Figure 7: An illustration of a proposed Chinese space station planned for by 2020…….48 
Figure 8: Map of Hainan Island and Wenchang Satellite Launch Facility………………56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129 
 
                                          LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1:  Reported Spaceflight Launched by Country, 2003-2007……………………………27 
Table 2:  Overview of China’s Space Launch Centers…………………………….........32 
Table 3:  Overview of Chinese Satellites………………………………………………..36 
Table 4:  Asian Space Organizations: Member Nations………………………………...82 
 
